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This paper argues that success in the struggle for regional integration hinges foremost 
on the degree of heterogeneity among regional states. Regional organizations therefore 
must  consider  how  to  optimize  their  leverage  to  forge  convergence  that  will  foster 
agreement  and  cooperation.  To  do  so,  regional  organizations  can  rely  on  inclusive 
designs that admit member states and then seek to mold their behavior ex post, or they 
can  use  exclusive  designs  that  condition  membership  on  ex  ante  changes  in  state 
behavior. This paper examines the success of these designs in using various ex ante 
versus ex post tools in soliciting cooperative behavior among regional states, arguing 
that ex ante tools generally have greater advantages. However, because the advantages 
vary by issue areas, regions may benefit from creating layers of institutions with different 
designs.  Finally,  even  after  admitting  states,  regional  organizations  have  options  for 
varying membership rules across different areas of cooperation. Drawing especially on 
the European experience, the paper considers these various forms of differentiated rules 
that  organizations  can  use  to  forge  cooperation  among  different  groups  of  member 
states despite remaining differences. 
 
 
Keywords: Regional integration, international cooperation, membership rules 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Regional  organizations  can  pursue  a  wide  array  of  membership  models.  The  most 
inclusive choice is a ―convoy‖ model, which allows all regional states to participate. Such 
organizations have low admission and participation criteria. They may still debate the 
admission of a given state, but the state is not asked to meet a set of formalized criteria 
as a standard condition of entry. At the other extreme, organizations may choose a ―club‖ 
model,  enforcing  strict  admission  criteria.
1  The  entry  requirements  may  vary.  For 
example, states may be required to have mechanisms for controlling corruption, or to 
implement  the fiscal  and  monetary  policies  of the  organization,  or to respect  human 
rights. Of course, organizations can choose a compromise between these models and 
membership rules can vary in many other ways.  
 
How do these rules matter for regional integration? The membership rules reflect the 
preferences of the founding states. If the preferences change, the rules can also be 
changed. However, this does not make the rules inconsequential. The initial choices are 
made under uncertainty and with imperfect information (Williamson, 1985), and change 
may be difficult. The inertia of existing institutions may be hard to overcome, or some 
flagship  organizations  may  become  too  significant  to  be  easily  circumvented.  More 
importantly,  to  the  extent  that  many  developments  are  path-dependent,  rules  may 
produce outcomes that can limit future options. As Baldwin (2010) notes, ―If the Treaty of 
Rome  had  expired  after  50  years  as  did  the  ECSC  [European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community] Treaty, it would be absolutely impossible to get unanimous agreement on 
renewing the institutions from today‘s 27 members‖. The choice of membership rules can 
shape the development of regional integration, because they determine which states 
control the decision-making structures and, therefore, influence the organization‘s ability 
to cooperate and shape the organization in the future.  
 
If all states in the region initially agreed on the nature of their cooperation and had no 
incentives  to  defect  from  their  agreements,  then  the  membership  rules  would  be 
unimportant.  However,  it  is  never  that  simple.  The  core  challenge  for  interstate 
cooperation and hence regional integration is heterogeneity among regional members. 
This is certainly true in Asia and it has been the case even in Europe. This heterogeneity 
takes three forms. The first is preference divergence: states in the region may prefer 
different political solutions to their common problems, or they may disagree about how to 
distribute  the  costs  and  benefits  of  cooperation  among  themselves.  In  trade  and 
environmental issues, for example, they may face instances of free riding, with a state 
preferring to renege on its agreement while other states keep theirs (Schelling, 1997). 
Even if they agree on the benefits of cooperation, states may disagree strongly about the 
exact  policy  solutions,  preferring,  in  economic  terms,  different  points  on  the  Pareto 
frontier  (Krasner,  1991).  Second,  states  may  differ  in  their  capacities  to  implement 
regional  polices.  Less  economically  developed  states  may  have  less  administrative 
capacity, or their economic or political fundamentals may not be conducive to stable 
                                                            
1  Note that here ―club‖ is not used to signify that the organization is providing a traditional economic 
―club  good‖—  that  is,  some  private  benefit  that  derives  value  partly  from  the  exclusion  of  some 
actors—but merely to denote organizations that have high entry requirements.  
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coordination with other states in the region. Finally, states may vary in their information 
and  beliefs.  For  example,  they  may  have  different  political  norms  about  domestic 
governance,  sovereignty,  and  interstate  interaction.  These  divergent  beliefs  create 
normative and distributional struggles, and make it difficult to adopt policies and enforce 
agreements (Keohane, 1984). Thus, heterogeneity among regional states in the form of 
divergent preferences, capacities, and beliefs is the core challenge of intergovernmental 
cooperation and regional integration. 
 
Because of this heterogeneity, the choice of membership model—whether organizations 
operate as convoys or clubs—can influence the success of regional integration. Clubs 
can leverage higher entry criteria to solicit behavior changes prior to admission for any 
late joiners. However, convoys, with lower entry barriers, can take a less confrontational 
approach  to  outlier  states,  interacting  with  them  within  the  organization  rather  than 
erecting barriers. Thus, these different membership models offer different mechanisms 
for how an organization can influence states in the region, leading to greater regional 
convergence  necessary  for  successful  integration.  This  ―R-H-I‖  relationship  between 
rules, heterogeneity, and integration is illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
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The question, therefore, is whether regional integration is more likely to succeed if there 
are  no  barriers  to  entry  and  member  states  use  post-admission  tools  to  solicit 
cooperation from each other? Or is regional integration more likely to succeed if it starts 
out with an exclusive organization of states that are all aligned to the organization‘s 
goals and then erects high barriers to entry and uses other pre-admission tools to solicit 
behavior changes prior to admission for any late joiners? This paper asks the following: 
what  type  of  heterogeneity  matters  for  regional  integration  efforts?  What  are  the 
advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  different  membership  models  with  respect  to 
influencing this heterogeneity among states in a region and building regional integration? 
How  can  organizations  navigate  differing  membership  models  to  their  advantage  to 




1.1  Plan of the Paper 
 
The  paper  draws  on  the  experiences  of  regional  organizations,  especially,  but  not 
exclusively,  in  Europe.  The  analysis  draws  on  research  from  political  science  and  
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economics, but it emphasizes the political analysis. A thorough analysis by an economist 
would render a useful complementary analysis.  
 
The paper begins by discussing the elements of successful regional integration that may 
be influenced by membership rules. This section starts by discussing the relevance of 
the traditional concern that the sheer number of participating states hinders effective 
cooperation.  However,  arguing  that  heterogeneity  is  actually  the  central  obstacle  to 
regional  integration  in  the  R-H-I  relationship,  the  paper  then  discusses  the  ―HI‖ 
relationship  between  heterogeneity  and  integration.  For  example,  what  elements  of 
heterogeneity matter for regional integration? In addition, this section argues that there is 
an important relationship between political and economic integration, and that regional 
integration efforts depend on national attitudes towards sovereignty. Through a regional 
comparison,  the  paper  further  examines  the  relationship  between  sovereignty  and 
regional integration.  
 
Next  the  paper  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  ―RH,‖  that  is,  the  relationship 
between membership rules and heterogeneity. It surveys the different tools organizations 
have  available  to  address  heterogeneity  among  regional  states,  paying  particular 
attention to how likely club and convoy designs are to use these tools successfully.  
 
The next section considers a broader range of membership models, not simply clubs 
and  convoys,  but  also  variations  on  the  models  that  may  allow  regions  to  promote 
deeper integration and work beyond existing institutional structures.  
 
The  paper  concludes  by  considering  the  implications  for  Asia.  The  paper  does  not 
provide answers, but it raises questions drawn from the insights of the paper in the hope 
that those with greater Asia expertise can use the questions constructively.  
2.  Elements of Successful Regional Integration 
 
2.1  Do Numbers Matter? 
 
Because membership rules influence the number of countries in an organization, it is 
important to consider whether the number of countries involved in regional organizations 
hampers cooperation. Traditionally, a greater number of actors has been considered to 
hamper cooperation, but this conjecture may well be overstated and, in some instances, 
even misleading.  
 
Traditional K-group theory argues that when enforcement is central to cooperation, as it 
most often is when there are complex rules and regulations that must be implemented 
and monitored, then more participants increase the enforcement problem and lower the 
benefits  of  cooperation  (Olson,  1965).  This  theory  implies  that  for  issues  requiring 
enforcement, large organizations may be impractical, particularly if entry requirements 
are low as in convoys, leaving the organization with few enforcement options.  
 
Regional experiences seem to confirm this. The African efforts to move towards a single 
monetary zone illustrate the difficulty of accomplishing such ambitious goals convoy- 
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style. The African Union (AU) established the African Economic Community through the 
1991 Abuja Treaty with the goal of achieving a single monetary zone for Africa by 2028. 
Various sub-regional groupings have proceeded highly unevenly, however, and some 
states  have  sought  to  break  free  of  the  laggards  by  creating  their  own  ―fast  tracks‖ 
towards greater monetary cooperation (Nnanna, 2006). Conversely, in South America, 
Mercosur started a process of regional economic integration with a smaller number of 
states and has been somewhat more successful. The same was true for the ECSC, 
formalized in 1951 and comprising the ―inner six,‖ of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands,  while  the  so-called  ―outer  seven,‖  of  Austria, 
Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK) were 
either unable or unwilling to join the successor organization to the ECSC—the European 
Economic  Community  (EEC)—and  instead  cooperated  among  themselves  through 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).  
 
Starting small by no means guarantees successful cooperation, as the relatively weak 
performances of the Andean Community and many African sub-groupings demonstrate. 
However, whereas there are some examples of regional organizations that started small 
and have been successful, there are no examples of large regional organizations that 
have achieved the same level of regional integration en masse. It may, of course, still be 
possible  for  some  organizations,  such  as  the  Economic  Community  of  West African 
States (ECOWAS), to eventually accomplish this objective. However, experience to date 
suggests that starting out with fewer states is a better formula for regional integration. 
 
The question of the relationship between the number of member states and the depth of 
cooperation among them has been the focus of the classic widening-versus-deepening 
debate in the European Union (EU) (Hausken, Mattli et al., 2006; Lorz and Willmann, 
2008).  Contrary  to  the  critics  of  enlargement,  the  EU  has  been  able  to  continue  to 
deepen  cooperation  while  also  widening  membership.  Thus,  although  there  is  no 
precedent for launching a fully functioning common market for a large number of states 
simultaneously,  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  number  of  cooperating  states  alone 
makes cooperation infeasible, although it undoubtedly makes it more cumbersome.  
 
Indeed, the difficulties of garnering cooperation among the many members of the EU 
may have been mistakenly attributed to the number of members. Recent work has found 
little support for the conjecture that in issue areas with greater enforcement problems, 
organizations tend to choose more restrictive membership models (Koremenos, Lipson 
et  al.,  2001).  However,  there  is  some  evidence  that  organizations  tend  to  restrict 
membership  more  when  there  is  greater  uncertainty  over  prospective  members‘ 
likelihood  to  exhibit  cooperative  behavior  and  compliance  with  organizational  norms. 
However,  rather  that  sheer  numbers,  it  appears  that  the  observed  difficulties  with 
cooperation among greater numbers likely stems from other fundamentals (for example, 
increased  economic  heterogeneity)  that  change  as  more  states  are  brought  into  the 
integration efforts; it is these changes, as opposed to the number of actors, that may do 
more to hamper cooperation (Keohane and Ostrom, 1995; Snidal, 1995).  
 
Furthermore, institutional devices, such as voting rules, can ameliorate the difficulties of 
decision  making  introduced  by  wider  participation  (Kahler,  1992).  For  example,  the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) amended its consensus- 
The Role of Membership Rules in Regional Organizations  |       5 
 
based decision making structure to avoid de facto veto rights for any one state. Thus, the 
OSCE adopted the ―consensus minus one‖ rule in 1992 so that in cases of a state‘s 
―clear, gross and uncorrected violation‖ of OSCE commitments, decisions could be taken 
without  the  consent  of  the  state  concerned  (CSCE,  1992).
2  Thus,  the  OSCE  has 
changed some decision-making rules to address its wide membership, as has the EU, 
which  has  moved  towards  majority  rules  and  other  compromise-decision  rules  on 
several  issues. The Association  of  Southeast Asian  Nations  (ASEAN),  however,  has 
maintained strong consensus-based rules. This poses problems under such pronounced 
heterogeneity  as  is  the  case  with  ASEAN,  and  does  make  a  growing  numbers  of 
participants more problematic.  
 
The  question  of  membership  models  is  therefore  related  to,  but  distinct  from,  the 
question  of  the  number  of  members  or  the  optimal  size  of  an  intergovernmental 
organization. Numbers matter, but not merely because more is always worse. More is 
worse only to the extent that more increase heterogeneity. 
 
2.2  Heterogeneity 
 
As noted in the introduction, states may vary in their capacities, information and beliefs, 
and in their preferences. Importantly, these factors are not fixed. Capacity, information 
and beliefs, and state preferences can change over time.  
 
Central  to  the  discussion  of membership models  and to the  argument of  this  paper, 
these factors may themselves be influenced by the cooperative institutional arrangement 
in the region. That is, just as state preferences will determine the design of regional 
cooperation,  so  these  regional  cooperation  choices  may  in  turn  influence  the 
preferences  of  states  in  the  region  over  time  (Hix,  2010).  Nowhere  has  this  been 
observed more than in Europe, where the EU has strongly shaped the member states 
and exerted immense influence on candidate states.  
 
Because  regional  integration  arrangements  can  influence  states  in  the  region  it  is 
important  to  consider  how  membership  models  vary  in  their  ability  to  influence  the 
behavior of states in the region (i.e., the RH relationship). Therefore, advantages and 
disadvantages of different membership models will be discussed later. First, however, it 
is  important  to  consider  the  HI  relationship:  how  does  the  heterogeneity  of  states 
matter  for  regional  integration?  What  aspects  of  states  are  important  in  facilitating 
integration? What attributes of regional cooperation influence the success of regional 
integration? These considerations are important because they highlight the conditions 
that  regional  organizations  need  to  address  to deepen  their cooperation  and  identify 




                                                            
2  In 1992, what was then referred to as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
used this rule to suspend Yugoslavia from the CSCE. The CSCE also adopted the ―consensus minus 
two‖ rule, which allows the Ministerial Council to instruct two disputing participating states to seek 
conciliation without their consent. To date, this option has not been put into practice.  
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There are many conditions that influence the success of regional economic integration 
efforts. Indeed, economist would surely take into account an extensive list of domestic 
economic and financial factors (Gochoco–Bautista, 2010), just as legal scholars could 
surely  consider  many  aspects  of  the  harmonization  of  laws  and  domestic  legislative 
requirements. The following discussion, however, focuses on other political and state 
characteristics that influence the success of regional integration. 
 
2.2.1  Regime Type 
 
Discussing the African context in the 1960s, Haas noted that ―countries which are poorly 
integrated internally make poor partners in a regional integration process because of the 
reluctance of leaders to further undermine their control at home (Haas, 1970).‖ More 
recently, research  is  emerging that  supports  this  claim.  Generally,  democracies  have 
been found  to  be more  likely  to cooperate  with  each  other  than  with  nondemocratic 
states on trade and finance. Democratic elections prompt leaders to cooperate more on 
international trade issues than their nondemocratic counterparts (Mansfield, Milner et al.; 
2002).  Other  scholars  contend  that  democratically  elected  legislatures  may  hinder 
multilateral cooperation (Rüland, 2009). This is clearly something that the EU has seen 
as it has struggled for the ratification of various treaties to deepen integration.  
 
Neofunctionalists  have  also  argued  that  integration  has  been  most  likely  to  emerge 
among richer liberal democratic countries, because these were less likely to have class 
conflict and ethnic rivalries, and could gain from regional economic integration (Haas 
and  Schmitter,  1964).  The  envisioned  that  the  process  of  integration  would  occur 
through  trade  and  labor,  and  capital  mobility.  Such  economic  exchanges  would 
eventually  spill  over  into  other  areas,  deepening  regional  integration.  Thus,  similar 
economic development and societal structures were viewed as optimal for deepening 
economic integration. Importantly for integration in diverse regions, states with different 
governance  systems  (democratic  versus  autocratic  regimes)  have  a  harder  time 
cooperating (Leeds, 1999). 
 
Other research also suggests that domestic governance problems may affect the ability 
of a state to adhere to its international commitments more generally. States with a low 
rule  of  law  or  low  administrative  capacities  are  less  likely  to  keep  their  international 
commitments  (Simmons  2000;  Weiss  and  Jacobson  2000;  Kelley  2007)(Pevehouse, 
2010). Some have argued, for example, that in ASEAN, corruption and unreliable judicial 
systems  hinder  integration  because  they  make  contracts  hard  to  enforce.  In  Central 
Asia,  for  example,  it  is the  autocratic  super-presidential  regimes that  hinder  regional 
cooperation (Pomfret, 2010). Significant research suggests that the domestic regime-
type influences intergovernmental cooperation and regions with democratic governments 
with a high rule of law have an advantage in terms of achieving regional integration.  
 
2.2.2  Information and Beliefs 
 
Related to domestic regime type is research suggesting that cooperation benefits from 
shared  information  and  beliefs  (Keohane  and  Ostrom,  1995).  With  cooperation  that 
requires commitments and trust, it is important that the participants share characteristics 
that define them as a community (Snidal, 1995). In the 1960s, authors writing about  
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regional integration emphasized not only economics, but also the importance of culture 
and  geography  (Russett, 1967;  Caparaso  and  Choi,  2002).  In  their  work  on  the 
European integration process, Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) argued that the main 
obstacles to economic integration are differences among national rules and norms, and 
that political integration, therefore, implies the need to either eliminate any differences or 
find ways to coordinate policies around them. Of course, potential member states need 
not  require  complete  agreement  on  beliefs  and  information  before  starting  regional 
integration, and, as discussed later, participating in regional integration efforts can itself 
contribute to the building of a shared identity and culture (Herrmann and Risse et al., 
2004). However, the benefit of some considerable level of shared norms and beliefs 
upon entering into cooperation remains. 
 
Venezuela‘s entrance into Mercosur highlights the importance of shared political beliefs. 
Oil-rich  Venezuela's  philosophical  opposition  to  free  trade  and  its  nationalization  of 
domestic industries has caused tensions as President Hugo Chávez has advocated for a 
shift  in  the  focus  of  the  bloc,  saying:  "We  need  a  Mercosur  that  prioritizes  social 
concerns. We need a Mercosur that every day moves farther away from the old elitist 
corporate  models  of  integration  that  look  for  ...  financial  profits,  but  forgets  about 
workers, children, life, and human dignity."
3 Thus, Venezuela‘s membership has caused 
considerable  debate.  As  of  August  2009,  Brazil  and  Paraguay  had  yet  to  ratify 
Venezuela's membership in the bloc.
4 
 
2.2.3  Economic Development and Capacity 
 
The  ability  of  states  to  succeed  in  regional  economic  integration  also  depends  on 
domestic economic conditions (Russett, 1967), as differences in degrees of economic 
development present hindrances to creating currency unions (Haas, 1970). Hass argued 
that  such  differences  were  central  to  the  failure  of  the  Latin  American  Free  Trade 
Association (LAFTA) in the 1960s. Others similarly argue that the divisions between oil-
poor and oil-rich states‘ in the Middle East have contributed to the failure of most of the 
early regional integration attempts.
5 
 
Indeed, when it comes to economic issues, the question of club membership is a quite 
practical question of whether the underlying fundamentals in the prospective countries 
are compatible with the economic cooperation objectives. Thus, prospective members 
may simply not have the capacity or the economic fundamentals that makes it optimal for 
the  organization  to  invite  them  to  join  in  a  particular  form  of  economic  cooperation 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992). Less-developed states often have less administrative 
capacity  to  handle  the commitments  of  integration.  In ASEAN, for  example,  average 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ranges from US$209 to US$50,000 per year, 
and this presents a wide range of economic needs and capacities.  
                                                            
3  http://www.cfr.org/publication/12762/#p6,  for  Chavez  statement  http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/ 
/news/1521 
4  Paraguayan  government  withdraws  bill  for  Venezuela‘s  Mercosur  incorporation.  MercoPress. 
14 August 2009. Brazilian Senate condemns Venezuela further delaying its Mercosur bid. MercoPress. 
4 September 2009. 
5  http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/20060117093527.O-2006-1.pdf  
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This is why the EU has spent so many resources on assistance programs to candidate 
states. The EU Phare program, for example, does not comprise purely altruistic aid, but 
an  effort to  bring  candidate  states to  a  comparable  level  of  economic fundamentals. 
Furthermore,  the  European  Commission  has  negotiated  extensively  with  countries  to 
insure that they have the capacity to implement community law. Much more could be 
added about the economic conditions needed for successful regional integration, with 
the  key  points  being  that  domestic  economic  conditions  are  central  when  forging 
regional  integration  and  states  in  a  region  must  consider  the  domestic  economic 
conditions and capacities to implement organizational commitments. Even with all these 
efforts, the EU has faced a deep crisis in 2010 as it learned of rising debt levels in 
Greece and other members of the single currency, the Euro. 
 
2.3  The Relationship between Political and Economic Integration 
 
Heterogeneity among states in the region is also important because it influences the 
ability of the states to build joint political institutions necessary for economic integration.
6 
Already  in  1964,  Haas  and  Schmitter  noted  that  deeper  economic  integration  is 
facilitated by deeper levels of political integration: ―[D]efinite political implications can be 
associated  with  most  movements  toward  economic  integration  even  when  the  chief 
actors  themselves  do  not  entertain  such  notions  at  the  time  of  adopting  their  new 
constitutive charter.‖ (Haas and Schmitter, 1964). Furthermore, scholars of European 
integration have stressed the centrality of political commitments to the integration efforts 
(Winters, 1997; Moravcsik, 1998) and the importance of institutions with independent 
authority (Pollack, 2003) (Hix, 2010). Politics was central to the ECSC in 1951, which 
was  intended  to  reduce  Franco-German  tensions.  Politics  has  also  been  central  to 
NAFTA, Mercosur, the ASEAN free trade area, and the Southern African Development 
Community  (Schiff  and  Winters,  1998).  Indeed,  in  his  seminal  article  on  regional 
integration, Hass defined regional integration as the ―voluntary creation of larger political 
units‖  (Haas,  1970)  and  argued  that  without  economic  integration  in  the  form  of  a 
common market, regional integration efforts were unlikely to have much influence on 
member states (Haas, 1970). In the same work he also argued that in the process of 
regional integration, states cease to be wholly sovereign. Thus, even if regional states 
initially do not intend for their cooperation to involve political dimensions, politics and 
economics are inevitably linked. 
 
The linkage between economic and political integration rests on the distributional politics 
created by international economic factors and the relationship between domestic politics 
and economic performance. Elaborating on the linkage between economic and political 
integration, and the level of shared institutions required to address them, is outside the 
scope of this paper. However, the linkage is central to discussing membership models, 
because  it  suggests  that  the  success  of  economic  integration  rests  partly  on  the 
willingness of the states in a region to participate in some level of political integration. A 
common market or greater levels of economic integration require political institutions and 
political  cooperation.  Thus,  the  absence  of  strong  institutions  within  the  ASEAN+3 
                                                            
6  Economists have created a typology of different of levels of economic integration such as free trade 
areas,  customs  unions,  common  market,  economic  union,  and  full  economic  integration  (Balassa, 
1961). These represent different levels of integration, although the necessity of the sequential nature is 
unclear (Caparaso and Choi, 2002) (Baldwin, 2010).  
The Role of Membership Rules in Regional Organizations  |       9 
 
framework, for example, poses challenges for deepening integration in East Asia (Dent, 
2010).
7 Fear of intrusions on sovereignty, as discussed later, are likely to hamper the 
development of common political institutions needed to facilitate economic and regional 
integration, as has been observed in the AU and the League of Arab Nations. 
 
2.4  Integration and Sovereignty: Regional Comparisons 
 
Because regional integration depends on the characteristics of regional states and their 
willingness to build joint political institutions, effective regional integration cannot be a 
sovereignty-neutral  process;  states  will  need  to  delegate  some  authority  to  regional 
institutions (Bradley and Kelley, 2008). Indeed, the choice of a club model is by definition 
an acceptance of some forms of organizational interference in domestic affairs, although 
this  interference—at  least  theoretically—occurs with  the  consent  of  the  state. As  the 
following discussion demonstrates, regional experiences to date suggest that regional 
attitudes to sovereignty are fundamental to regional integration. 
 
2.4.1  High Defense of Sovereignty, Weak Integration: The AU and the 
Arab League 
 
Although  the  original  Organization  of  African  Unity  (OAU)  set  ambitious  goals 
rhetorically, in the wake of colonialism the primary goal of the member states was to 
confirm their own sovereignty and assure existing borders (Herbst, 2007). Thus, African 
regional  organization  tends  to  be  highly  inclusive,  non-hierarchical,  and  attentive  to 
national sovereignty (Herbst, 2007). The OAU was effective at maintaining the boundary 
regime, but ineffective at promoting intergovernmental cooperation. Many attempts at 
economic unions in Africa under the OAU failed (Herbst, 2007).  
 
However, with the reorganization of the OAU into the AU in 2002, the organization has 
become more interventionist. The OAU refused to interfere in the "internal affairs" of 
member states, and stood by during the genocide in Rwanda. However, the constitution 
of the new AU permits collective intervention in a member state to combat "war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity," and has taken action in Darfur  (Cohen and 
O'Neill, 2006). Breakthroughs have been limited to peacekeeping, however. The AU‘s 
attempts to build institutions to oversee human rights and elections have been toothless 
(Anglin, 1998; African Union, 2002; Kelley, 2009a). The African Commission on Human 
and People‘s Rights created by the 1981 Charter on Human and People‘s Rights has no 
powers.
8 Although the number of democracies in Africa has more than doubled since the 
organization‘s  founding  and  the AU  has  begun  to  address  coups  by  suspending  the 
membership  of  several  countries,  these  efforts  have  been  ineffective  and  the 
organization has continued to be guided by lowest common denominator policies.  
 
The Arab League experience is similar to that of the OAU. Cooperation was not hindered 
by an unwieldy number of members, as the original league, formed in 1945, only had 
                                                            
7  ASEAN+3  comprises  the  ten  member  economies  of  ASEAN plus  the  People‘s  Republic  of  China, 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
8  Nwankwo, Clement. 1993. The OAU and Human Rights. Journal of Democracy. Volume 4 (3). Pp. 50–
54.  
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seven members (Barnett and Solingen, 2007). However, the League has not promoted 
regional integration, because Arab leaders, like those of Africa, created their regional 
organization mainly to protect their nations‘ sovereignty. Rhetoric of Arab unity was used 
to  legitimize  their  regimes,  but  not  to  undertake  cooperation  that  would  delegate 
authority to the regional organization. Thus, the Arab League was created not to promote 
change, but to preserve the status quo (Barnett and Solingen, 2007). As a result, the 
Arab League has never removed economic barriers and trade between member states 
has remained low. As in Africa, common markets and other economic measures remain 
weak, although the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) has been a step forward.
9 
The  Arab  League‘s  conflict  resolution  track-record  has  been  similarly  unimpressive 
(Barnett and Solingen, 2007).  
 
Thus, both the OAU and the Arab League were designed to be weak. The persistently 
low ambitions of their member states along with their convoy structure have ensured 
lowest common denominator policies. However, their performances have not been weak 
because OAU and Arab League member states chose convoy structures, rather member 
states  deliberately  chose  convoy  structures  because  they  wanted  their  respective 
regional organizations to be weak and focus narrowly on protecting sovereignty.  
 
2.4.2  Changing Attitudes Towards Sovereignty: The OAS and ASEAN 
 
ASEAN and the Organization of American States (OAS) both started as convoys with 
fairly weak intergovernmental cooperation agendas, but have subsequently undergone 
pressure  to  change  as  some  countries  have  increased  their  ambitions  for  their 
respective organization‘s role in regional cooperation.  
 
ASEAN fits this pattern with regard to its non-interference policy. As the organization has 
matured, its ambition for regional economic integration has grown and it has launched 
efforts such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Trade in Services, both of 
which offer considerable potential in the future. ASEAN also launched the Single Asian 
Market  and  the  Comprehensive  Investment  Area,  although  these  remain  far  from 
operational.  However,  the  organization‘s  members  have  been  at  odds  over  the 
membership criteria and the extent to which domestic conditions matter when admitting 
states,  a  question  that  went  directly  to  the  organization‘s  policy  of  complete  non-
interference in domestic matters.  
 
Disagreements about whether there should be any domestic pre-conditions for joining 
ASEAN began with the application of Viet Nam and Cambodia (Acharya, 2001). After 
Cambodia‘s  coup,  a  special  ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers‘  meeting  reaffirmed  the 
commitment to non-interference, but also decided to delay admission of Cambodia and 
send an ASEAN delegation there. Singapore‘s Foreign Minister said that if ASEAN had 
not delayed Cambodia‘s entry, this would imply that ASEAN condoned unconstitutional 
changes  of  government.  This  view  revealed  a  possible  shift  in  the  non-interference 
doctrine by suggesting that forcible ouster of governments violated an ASEAN norm. 
However, it was not a formal ASEAN position. Furthermore, the ASEAN position was that 
                                                            
9  In  1997,  14 Arab  countries  concluded  an  agreement  to  create  the  Greater Arab  Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA). By 2005, tariff removal was complete, but the removal of non-tariff barriers was not (Abedini 
and Péridy, 2008).  
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the  reaction  was  justified  because  Cambodia‘s  events  violated  the  Paris  Peace 
Agreement and were therefore not entirely domestic (Acharya, 2001). In response to the 
coup  in  Cambodia,  the  Malaysian  Deputy  Prime  Minister  suggested  a  policy  of 
―constructive  intervention.‖  Although  ASEAN  rejected  this  policy,  Thailand‘s  Foreign 
Minister conceded that there was a recognition that ―growing interdependence‖ meant 
that ASEAN needed to rethink some of its assumptions about non-interference (Acharya, 
2001). 
 
ASEAN also delayed observer status for Myanmar and vigorously debated the extent to 
which Myanmar‘s internal politics mattered for its entry. Some countries advocated a 
demand for domestic policy changes, some stressed the non-interference doctrine, and 
others argued that admitting Myanmar to ASEAN could have a positive impact on its 
domestic political situation (Acharya, 2001). When ASEAN leaders signed a charter to 
further economic integration and commit to creating a human rights body in November 
2007, several ASEAN countries threatened to refuse to ratify the charter until Myanmar 
improved  its  human  rights  record.  However,  within  a  year  they  had  all  ratified  the 
agreement although Myanmar had showed no progress. An ASEAN human rights body 
has  officially  been  created  but  lacks  any  real  power  and  will  be  bound  by  the  non-
interference policy of ASEAN.  
 
In  Asia,  more  generally,  the  emphasis  continues  to  be  on  sovereignty  and  non-
interference (Caballero-Anthony, 2010). The cautious attitudes towards non-intervention 
and sovereignty may create institutional roadblocks for ASEAN, because they prevent 
the strengthening of the central secretariat to the degree necessary to carry out its goals 
(Severino, 2010).  
 
The experience of the OAS is interesting to compare with ASEAN, because the OAS 
also started as an organization opposed to interference in domestic affairs. However, 
many  member  states  underwent  significant  changes  during  the  1970s  and  1980s 
(Cooper and Legler, 2001). Thus, in the last two decades, the OAS has also seen a 
period of convergence on higher preferences for intergovernmental cooperation and the 
states in the region have endowed the organization with greater influence in domestic 
affairs.  
 
In the organizations‘ early years there were great disagreements about the extent to 
which  the  organization  should  interfere  in  domestic  affairs  to  uphold  democratic 
governance. The Inter-American Juridical Committee wrote a report reaffirming the OAS 
Charter‘s commitment to human rights and democracy, but the committee also upheld 
that collective action to restore democracy would be inadmissible under the terms of the 
Charter  of  Bogota.  Thus,  the  1959  Draft  Convention  on  the  Effective  Exercise  of 
Representative Democracy was too controversial and failed (Munoz, 1993). Similarly, in 
1962 the OAS excluded Cuba from decision-making power in the organization, but was 
passive as many other dictatorships reigned during the 1970s. 
 
The OAS has benefitted from the fact that democratization has been so pervasive in 
most of the region that the result has not been insurmountable divergence, but rather 
shared growing preferences for deeper cooperation. Thus, the organization has been 
able  to  make  significant  changes  since  the  Cold  War  ended.  Cooperation  between  
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member states has deepened and broadened over the organization‘s life span as nearly 
all  states in the region have become more democratic and more interested in trans-
border cooperation on drugs, corruption, and many other issues.  
 
Importantly, however, there is little evidence that it was the convoy-like structure of the 
OAS that lead to this convergence over time. Rather, many of the activities of the OAS to 
uphold  democratic  norms  have  only  emerged  after  the  countries  in  the  region 
established their democratic regimes  (Cooper and Legler, 2001). The OAS was then 
able to capitalize on these national changes to institutionalize organizational procedures 
such as the Santiago Declaration and the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy to help 
the countries in the region to ―lock in‖ these domestic changes. Thus, although the OAS 
has not changed its membership composition much, its membership rules have grown 
more club-like over time; the membership criteria have hardened, making suspension 
and  interference  more  likely.  Yet,  these  changes  were  gradual.
10  Only  decades  of 
changes in domestic conditions led to a move away from strict non-intervention.  
 
Ironically, even if the OAS has been able to deepen political cooperation, despite its 
organization of the Summits for the Americas, which launched the so-far unsuccessful 
talks on the Free Trade Area of the Americas in 1994, the OAS has been far too large 
and  diverse  to  act  as  an  effective  vehicle  for  regional  economic  integration.  Smaller 
regional  sub-groups  such  as  NAFTA,  Mercosur,  and  the  Andean  Community  have 
instead begun to address this challenge. The lesson of OAS, therefore, is that changes 
towards  sovereignty  came  from  the  member  states,  not  from  the  convoy  structure. 
Furthermore,  whereas  flexible  attitudes  towards  sovereignty  may  be  necessary  for 
productive regional integration, they are not sufficient for an organization to succeed in a 
very large and diverse region.  
 
2.4.3  Sovereignty in Europe 
 
Europe  differs  strongly  from  other  regions  because  of  its  longer  experience  with 
democracy, the devastation of the Second World War, and the subsequent East–West 
division, among other factors. Importantly, however, one of the ways in which Europe 
differs  considerably  from  other  regions  where  integration  is  less  advanced  concerns 
attitudes  towards  sovereignty.  Contrary  to  developments  in  these  other  regions,  the 
European organizations were founded on a desire to avoid the rouge state behavior that 
had led to the rise of Nazi Germany and the Second World War. Germany, one of the 
largest states in Europe, has supported the creation of a supra-national structure to limit 
its  own  freedom  (Krasner,  2001),  and  other  states  have  agreed  to  ―pool‖  their 
sovereignty in order to tie Germany‘s hands. European countries also learned to accept 
constraints through conditions attached to the Marshall Plan and the security provisions 
of the Atlantic alliance  (Wallace, 1999). Furthermore, the formation of the Council of 
Europe was driven by a desire of states to use regional institutions to ―lock in‖ their own 
commitments to democracy by binding themselves to institutions (Moravcsik, 2003).   
 
 
                                                            
10  For a good overview of the history of the many events that led to a deeper and more formalized OAS 
commitment to democracy, see Munoz (1993).  
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Thus, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference had a lower priority in Europe 
than  elsewhere  (Keohane,  2002).  Rather,  states  were  keen  to  use  the  regional 
organizations  to  commit  themselves  to  democracy  and  human  rights.  Supranational 
institutions  became  drivers  of  integration  in  Europe  (Baldwin,  2010).  The  growing 
regional  interdependence  has  created  further  incentives  for  the  greater  pooling  of 
sovereignty (Keohane, 2002). And the countries seeking to join the EU have been willing 
to do so at the cost of a reduction in their sovereignty. Again, this has been facilitated by 
decades of oppression in communist states, and the desire of these newly independent 
states to avoid a repeat of this oppressive past. Thus, on all fronts, European states 
have been more tolerant towards intrusions into their traditional sovereignty. 
 
 
3.  Addressing Heterogeneity and Building Foundations for 
Successful Cooperation 
 
The preceding section has made three central sets of claims: 
  
(i)  Heterogeneity  is  the  main  obstacle  to  regional  integration.  Several 
domestic  characteristics  of  a  state  influence  the  success  of  regional 
integration.  Therefore,  regional  integration  is  more  likely  to  succeed 
among  democratic  governments  and  governments  that  share  cultures, 
norms, and values.  Regional integration is also more likely to succeed 
among  countries  where  the  rule  of  law  is  established  and  among 
countries  that  have  sufficient  capacity  to  implement  the  obligations  of 
membership in regional integration efforts. Great disparities in economic 
development  hinder  regional  integration  because  the  differences  in 
economic fundamentals hinder stable coordination. 
  
(ii)  Political  integration  and  economic  integration  are  intricately  linked. 
Therefore,  regional  integration  may  be  hampered  when  states  are 
unwilling to create joint institutions. 
  
(iii)  Furthermore,  regional  integration  cannot  be  a  sovereignty-neutral 
process. Greater opposition to interference has traditionally led to convoy 
designs and hindered regional cooperation. One of the defining features 
of  the  successful  integration  of  Europe  has  been  a  more  accepting 
attitude towards the pooling of sovereignty. 
 
The  H  in  the  R-H-I  relationship  has  been  refined  to  encompass  several  domestic 
characteristics  as  well  as  attitudes  towards  joint  political  institution  building  and,  by 
implication, attitudes toward sovereignty. The importance of heterogeneity means that 
regional integration cannot be separated from domestic governance issues or political 
integration.  Visions  of  pure  economic  integration  that  ignore  these  areas  are  not 
particularly  promising.  Thus,  even  an  organization  that  wishes  to  stick  solely  to  a 
mandate for economic integration will have to build political institutions and consider 
some level of political integration.  
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Furthermore,  the  greater  the  heterogeneity  among  regional  states,  the  more  an 
organization will have to consider how it can encourage domestic governance that will 
facilitate  regional  integration.  This  paper  now  turns  to  consideration  of  the  tools  of 
influence associated with international organizations more generally.  
 
3.1  Mechanisms for Shaping State Behavior 
 
At  the  core  of  the  question  about  membership  rules  is  a  deeper  question  that  all 
intergovernmental  organizations  face:  if  regional  integration  is  to  be  broad  and 
successful,  what  is  the  best  way  of  shaping  the  behavior  of  states  in  the  region? 
Research suggests that the behavior of government and decision-making elites can be 
influenced through at least two mechanisms.  
 
The first is the use of incentives. Sanctions and political conditionality can change the 
incentive  structure  of  decision-making  elites  by  altering  their  payoffs  for  different 
behaviors (Crawford, 1997; Hufbauer and Schott et al., 2007). This mechanism rests on 
the  rationalist  assumption  that  actors  are  cost-benefit-calculating,  utility-maximizing 
actors.  This  concept  was  illustrated  well  by  Bulgarian  Prime  Minister  Ivan  Kostov‘s 
comment in April 2000 as Bulgaria was vying to join the EU: ―With all my respect for the 
West, I am watching there only the opinion of the structures, which finance Bulgaria. All 
the others, whatever they say, are of no importance.‖
11 Because they yield benefits for 
their  members,  intergovernmental  organizations  may  be  able  to  alter  the  incentive 
structures of non-member and member states in a variety of ways, such as promising 
rewards or punishment for behavior, or by providing institutional assurances that help 
governments commit to certain policies.  
 
The  second  mechanism  seeks  to  change  not  simply  the  behavior,  but  also  the 
underlying preferences and beliefs of decision-making elites by socializing them into a 
new set of norms. Socialization does not link any material incentives to behavior, but 
relies on persuading or shaming actors in order to change their policies or simply to 
habituate them into new behavior. Socialization occurs though discourse, diplomacy, and 
frequent  interactions  with  state  actors.  Such  efforts  may  change  behavior  either  by 
changing actors‘ beliefs or by appealing to a state‘s concern for its reputation (Johnston, 
2001; Kelley, 2004b). Intergovernmental organizations may be expected to act as ―sites 
of  socialization‖  (Checkel,  2005),  because    state  agents  are  ―exposed  to  alternative 
theories  about  the  nature  of  world  politics‖  (Johnston,  2001).  Thus,  constructivists 
scholars  have argued that institutions can not only constrain states, but can actually 
change their interests (Finnemore, 1996; Checkel, 1999; Checkel, 2005) and help diffuse 
norms  to  other  member  states  (McNeely,  1995).  The  managerial  approach  within 
international  law  also  suggests  that  international  organizations  may  cause  states  to 
redefine their  own  interests.  Participation  in  organizational  discourse  and  activities  is 
said to be able to realign domestic priorities and induce compliance with organizational 
norms  (Chayes  and  Chayes,  1995).  Convoy  organizations  are  argued  to  facilitate 
dialogue and socialization (Acharya, 2010). 
 
 
                                                            
11  Reuters Wire Service, 14 April 2000.  
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Whether organizations are able to effectively employ these incentive and socialization 
mechanisms depends on what tools they have available before and after admission—ex 
ante  and  ex  post  admission  tools. Thus,  membership  rules  can  influence  a  region‘s 
heterogeneity. This paper naturally cannot assess the overall effectiveness of all these 
tools, but this section of the paper seeks to provide a catalog of measures and asks: how 
does the ability of clubs and convoys to use these tools differ? What are some possible 
dimensions of the relationship between membership rules and state heterogeneity (i.e., 
RH)?  How  important  is  the  ability  of  a  club  to  use  ex  ante  tools  compared  to  a 
convoy‘s  ability  to  use  ex  post  tools?  What  advantages  and  disadvantages  do  the 
different organizational models bring to each of the tools of influence? This section ends 
with a summary, but the discussion below provides greater detail. 
 
3.2  Ex Ante Tools 
 
3.2.1  Membership Conditionality 
 
As discussed above, the strength of the club approach is its ability to set requirements 
for entry. The use of membership conditionality is, therefore, by definition restricted to 
clubs. Downs and Rocke et al. (1998) argue that if an organization uses a club model to 
manipulate the order and timing of entries, including promoting earlier entry for states 
that favor deeper cooperation, this allows it to reduce the negative consequences of 
increasing the breadth and depth of cooperation.
12 Using a formal model, they argue that 
starting out small with a club model and then admitting more states, as they align their 
preferences with the organization, leads to organizations with greater depth than those 
based  on  a  convoy  model,  because  a  club  model  with  conditional  enlargement  can 
achieve both breadth and greater depth.
13 Forming smaller clubs and then relying on 
strict  admission  criteria also  allows  the  existing  members to  establish their  preferred 
policies before inviting outsiders (Hausken and Mattli et al., 2006). Clubs can, therefore, 
be  much  more  demanding  of  newcomers,  offering  asymmetrical  benefits  to  the  core 
founding states. 
 
These claims align well with the experiences of the EU.  The initial six member states 
were able to cooperate on a deeper level and in a manner closer to their preferences 
than would have been the case had a compromise been reached with the states that 
choose  instead  to  form  EFTA.  Only  after  EFTA‘s  member  states  changed  their 
preferences towards greater integration did they join the EU, and they did so on the EU‘s 
terms, adopting wholesale its existing policies and obligations (Winters, 1997). This does 
not mean that the new member states have been entirely unable to influence the future 
policies of the EU. But as a counterfactual, it seems plausible that the EU has reached 
                                                            
12  Even  some  research  on  common  pool  resource  problems,  which  are  generally  characterized  by 
increased benefits the greater the level of participation, suggests that environmental problems may 
benefit from a club structure (Finus and Altamirano-Cabrera et al., 2005). 
13  ―We  show  how  the  strategy  of  admitting  potential  members  sequentially  over  time  based  on  their 
preferences for cooperation … produces a multilateral organization that will often be deeper at every 
stage of its development than would be obtained by an inclusive strategy; and it mitigates, even if it 
does not fully eliminate, the breadth–depth trade-off so prominent in the existing literature. As a result, 
large multilaterals  that  start out  small  will  tend  to  become  considerably  ‗‗deeper‘‘  in  a  cooperative 
sense than those that start out with many members‖ (Downs and Rocke et al., 1998).  
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greater depth of cooperation because it waited to admit member states only as their 
preferences for integration changed. 
 
Indeed,  the  European  clubs  have  been  quite  effective  at  using  membership 
conditionality. Because the organizations offer considerable benefits and because they 
are clubs, these organizations have been able to extract considerable concessions from 
applicant states. This has been true even for the Council of Europe, although it does not 
offer benefits commensurate with those of the EU. However, because no state has ever 
joined the EU without first joining the Council of Europe, the Council has been able to 
benefit from the leverage of the EU attraction on non-member states. Still, the Council of 
Europe  has  applied  membership  conditionality  with  mixed  results,  partly  because  its 
broad membership has sometimes made it difficult for the organization to be consistent 
in its enforcement of the membership criteria. There are clear success cases, however. 
For  example,  since  1994,  the  Council  of  Europe  has  been  effective  at  requiring  the 
abolishment of the death penalty in any applicant states (Schabas, 1999).  
 
The EU in particular has been strict in its entry requirements and has grown even more 
so as it fine-tuned its accession tools during the 1990s. For example, the December 
1999 Helsinki European Council made it an explicit condition that a country must have 
stable  democratic  institutions,  not  only  to  join  the  EU  but  also  to  be  able  to  open 
negotiations  to  join the EU. This  was  why  the  opening  of Turkey‘s  negotiations  was 
delayed once again and did not start until 2000.  
 
The success of the EU in using membership conditionality to solicit behavioral changes 
in  candidate  states  is  strongly  established  in  the  extensive  literature  on  the  subject 
(Kelley, 2004a; Kelley, 2004b; Vachudova, 2005; Epstein, 2008; Epstein and Sedelmeier, 
2008;  Pridham,  2008;  Sasse,  2008;  Schimmelfennig,  2008;  Sedelmeier,  2008).  The 
tenuous  transitions  from  post-communism  were  greatly  aided  by  the  assistance  and 
incentives of the European organizations, leading to greater convergence of preferences 
between  the  formerly  divided  halves  of  Europe  and  enabling  broader  and  stronger 
regional integration.   
 
Furthermore, the EU has been able to ensure that candidate states adopted the required 
legislation and created needed capacity to address the economic commitments of their 
membership. Although candidate states have been able to choose how they would like 
to meet their obligations in many areas (Jacoby, 2004), the candidate states have not 
been  able  to  negotiate  the  content  of  their  obligations  as  members;  the  rules  of 
membership had to be taken as a given at the time of entry (Grabbe, 2003).  
 
Some argue that the candidate states have adopted policies much faster than current 
member  states  did.  For  example,  Grabbe  argued  that:  ―It  took  Greece  well  over  a 
decade to adapt to the EU‘s single market norms. By contrast, prospective CEE [Central 
and Eastern European] members are expected to have oriented their institutions and 
policies to the EU prior to membership, which means less than a decade in practice. 
Moreover, they have done so from a much lower starting-point and with very limited 
scope for negotiating transitional periods. The EU has been able to push CEE policy 
reforms faster than they would otherwise have gone because of the priority accorded to 
accession by their governments and because of the institutional lacunae resulting from  
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the communist era‖ (Grabbe, 2002b). This would suggest that leverage is greater on 
countries outside the club than inside it and, therefore, all else being equal, the more 
behavioral adaptations the organization can extract prior to entry, the better.  
 
Of course, the effectiveness of the club approach depends on whether the non-member 
states indeed do eventually align their preferences with the club members. But the EU 
case suggests that to the extent that the club is able to achieve deep cooperation that 
yields highly valuable benefits, exclusion may become too costly for non-member states, 
even if originally they preferred not to cooperate. Thus, strong regional clubs will likely 
present non-members with increasing incentives to meet the requirements to join the 
organization. 
 
3.2.2  Associational Memberships 
 
The EU has also made effective use of degrees of membership by offering, for example, 
association  agreements  and  pre-accession  agreements. Advancing from  one  level  of 
membership to the next has been a powerful incentive for candidate states, allowing the 
EU to use leverage at multiple points in time. The EU‘s accession process has evolved 
to  include  a  multitude  of  steps  and tools  (Grabbe,  2002a;  Kelley,  2004a). The more 
arduous the  process  and  the greater the  number  of evaluation  points and  stages  of 
accession, the greater the opportunity for the organization to identify weaknesses, push 
for  the  adaptation  of  domestic  laws  and  regulations,  and  create  decision  points  that 
focus  attention  on  applicant  states.
  The  danger,  however,  is  that  the  process  is  so 
arduous that it appears unattainable, as it has perhaps at times in the case of Turkey in 
relationship to the EU. This may have the effect of lowering the organization‘s credibility 
and thus its leverage vis-à-vis a candidate state.  
 
Again,  club  organizations  are  more  likely  to  be  able  to  use  associational  or  other 
intermediate  memberships  as  a  tool  of  influence.  Whereas  convoys  may  use 
associational  memberships,  these  are  not  considered  halfway  stations  to  full 
membership and, therefore, do not provide leverage as such. As noted, for example, 
Myanmar briefly had observer status in ASEAN, but this had no influence on Myanmar‘s 
behavior. That said, associational memberships or observer status can be used by any 
organization to bring countries into institutional forums, thus increasing the opportunity 
for socialization, as will be discussed further below. 
 
3.2.3  Ex Ante Monitoring 
 
Both the Council of Europe and the EU have used monitoring in conjunction with the 
accession process. The Council of  Europe has extensive monitoring procedures and 
issues numerous political and legal recommendations before a country can enter the 
organization.  The  Council  of  Europe‘s  rapporteurs  visit  applicant  countries  and  bring 
reports to the Assembly, which then passes resolutions recommending policy changes 
that  must  be  accomplished  before  admission.  Sometimes  however,  the  Council  of 
Europe accepts a commitment from a state to change a controversial policy within a pre-
set  timeframe,  most  commonly  6 months.  Although  no  systematic  research  exists 
comparing  the  pre-accession  conditions  with  post-accession  expectations,  there  is 
evidence that at least on some issues states are less likely to implement the changes if  
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they are allowed to join the organization without having first implemented the changes 
(Kelley, 2004b). This contrast offers an interesting insight into the debate about whether 
it is easier to influence countries from within an organization or outside of it. 
 
The  EU  has  also  monitored  candidate  states  very  effectively.  The  European 
Commission,  which  oversees  enlargement,  instituted  annual  reviews  that  contained 
recommendations as to the readiness of each candidate state according to the goals set 
out  in  various  accession  agreements.  Candidate  states  know  that  their  accession 
progress is closely tied to meeting the recommendations in the report. Thus, candidate 
states work eagerly to address concerns and await the issuance of each annual report 
with considerable anticipation (Kelley, 2004a; Vachudova, 2005). 
 
As part of the monitoring, the EU has also worked to ensure that candidate countries 
have  been  ready  take  on  their  many  obligations  once  inside  the  union.  Thus,  the 
European Commission has negotiated compliance with the entire body of EU law before 
entry, assisted prospective members to gain competency to implement their obligations 
of membership, and incorporated transition periods for countries in areas of obligations 
where they were not yet ready to join.  
 
3.2.4  Suspending Guest Status 
 
The EU has also suspended intermediate agreements to pressure states. Because it 
uses an extensive graduated approach to membership, there are numerous stages at 
which the EU can suspend the association and accession process. After the overthrow 
of the democratically elected Greek government in 1967, the EU suspended Greece‘s 
Association  Agreement.  Some  scholars  argue  that  this  pressure  was  important  in 
Greece‘s  1973  transition  to  democracy,  because  it  undermined  the  military  regime 
financially  and  politically:  ―Exclusion  from  the  rapidly  integrating  Community  was  a 
singularly dangerous prospect‖ (Coufoudakis, 1977; Verney and Couloumbis, 1991). The 
EU has also suspended the associations of candidates and guest observers on several 
occasions with Turkey, Belarus, Croatia, and others. However, the EU‘s influence on 
Belarus  appears  minimal.
14  In  Turkey‘s  case,  suspension  may  have  only  reinforced 
domestic beliefs that EU membership was unattainable.  
 
The Council of Europe also suspended Belarus‘ Special Guest status in 1997 due to the 
lack of progress on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; and froze Belarus‘ 
membership application the following year  (Parliamentary Assembly, 2009). However, 
this suspension appears to have had little effect on the behavior of Belarus. 
 
3.3  Ex Ante or Ex Post Tools 
 
3.3.1  Exchanges, Workshops and Legal Advice 
 
Both clubs and convoys may engage in various activities to educate non-member states 
on a set of behavior or norms. This may include education programs such as academic 
or  parliamentary  exchanges,  or  running  workshops  or  conferences,  all  of  which  are 
                                                            
14  See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf.  
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techniques used to varying degrees by the EU and Council of Europe. Such efforts rarely 
produce  large  changes  that  can  be  captured  by  standard  measurements.  However, 
research has also shown that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was able to 
teach some new liberal-democratic norms to incoming East European actors (Gheciu, 
2005). Furthermore, the Council of Europe and the EU have both offered such legal 
advice  and  often  worked  directly  with  national  officials  to  formulate  draft  legislation 
before countries entered their respective organizations (Grabbe, 2002a; Kelley, 2004a). 
The EU also offers support trough ―twinning‖, which is a process whereby the EU sends 
a  civil  servant  from  an  EU  member  state  to  advise  candidate  states  on  the 
implementation of EU policies. 
 
Most of the examples of these programs having any success are connected to clubs. At 
least this is the case in Europe. Indeed, scholars have argued that many of the efforts of 
monitoring  and  socialization  of  non-members  may  work  only  when  used  with  states 
hoping to enter the organization (Johnston, 2001). A convoy-structured organization can 
practice  these  tools  just  as  much  as  clubs.  For  example,  the  OSCE  has  engaged 
extensively in providing legal advice on the protection of national minorities. However, 
the impact of OSCE efforts has been contingent on EU cooperation (Kelley, 2004a). 
 
Furthermore, the little research there is on the effectiveness of workshops and legal 
advice, for example, has focused on the teaching of political norms and behaviors. This 
is primarily because these tools are not typically employed to get states to comply with 
an organization‘s economic policies.  
 
3.4  Ex Post Tools 
 
3.4.1  Socialization 
 
After admission, organizations may seek to socialize member states through monitoring, 
educational programs, and legal advice, as well as exposure to organizational discourse 
through member state interactions. Convoy organizations have to rely more heavily on 
this mechanism, as the ex ante tools are not available to them. Furthermore, because 
convoy organizations admit more outlier states, they have a greater need to socialize 
member states to enable institutional cooperation.  
 
As noted earlier, scholars have argued that intergovernmental organizations may expose 
state agents to alternate views and socialize them to new norms (Chayes and Chayes, 
1995;  McNeely,  1995;  Finnemore,  1996;  Johnston,  2001;  Checkel,  2005).  However, 
empirical  research  on  socialization  is  still  scarce,  due  mostly  to  the  difficulty  of 
measuring preferences and identifying sources of preference changes. Subsequently, 
research  on socialization  within  intergovernmental  organizations  lacks the  consensus 
over effectiveness that exists with membership conditionality. 
 
Some scholars have found evidence of socialization within international organizations. 
Bearce and Bondanella (2007) argue that intergovernmental organizations promote the 
convergence of member state preferences as measured by voting records within the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly. Interestingly, they find the strongest effect of this  
20          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 53 
within Asia. Kent (2002) also documents several issue areas ranging from disarmament 
to labor rights, where the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) has redefined its interests 
via  participation  in  international  organizations.  Sometimes this  has  been  a  pragmatic 
adjustment, but in other cases it has led to institutionalization of norms within the PRC. 
Acharya (2010) also documents several instances of socialization with respect to the 
PRC, India, and Viet Nam. 
 
However,  research  on  socialization  has  focused  primarily  on  norms  and  political 
behavior. As discussed earlier, the CSCE directly contributed to changes in human rights 
behavior within participant states. The participation of Mikhail Gorbachev and other high-
level Soviet officials led to significant learning within the government, and, ultimately to 
changes  in  behavior  (Thomas, 2001  and  2005).  The  United  Nations  Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has also successfully taught member 
states  the  importance  of  creating  national  scientific  agencies,  which  has  led  to  the 
creation of such agencies in many member states (Finnemore, 1993). Other research 
also finds some evidence of the socialization of domestic militaries after admission to 
NATO (Tovias, 1984; Pevehouse, 2003). Finally, several regional organizations—such as 
the Council of Europe, OSCE, and OAS—monitor elections in member states in an effort 
teach electoral norms. Success has been mixed, but it exists (Kelley, 2009b).  
 
On  the  other  hand,  some  scholars  find  little  evidence  of  socialization  within 
organizations.  Some researchers have found that the views of EU officials are largely 
determined by domestic factors (Beyers, 2005; Hooghe, 2005). Others also dispute that 
there  are  any  effects  of  intergovernmental  organizations  more  generally  on  member 
state preferences (Boehmer, Gartzke et al., 2004). Efforts by the Council of Europe and 
EU  vis-à-vis  the  post-communists  states,  through  a  series  of  interactions  and 
reprimands, tended only to work when domestic opposition to the proposed norms were 
weak, domestic actors favoring the norms held power within government coalitions, or 
when these socialization efforts were combined with powerful membership incentives 
from the EU (Kelley, 2004b; Kelley, 2004a). Furthermore, Myanmar has been a clear 
example  that ASEAN‘s  policy  of  constructive  engagement,  which  rests  entirely  on  a 
philosophy of socialization, is not working. Prior  to admission, Myanmar  made some 
minor concessions on the repatriation of Muslim refugees (Zaw, 2001), but has made no 
further concessions.. On the contrary, after admission to ASEAN, Myanmar ratcheted up 
its oppression of the opposition, having seen its admission as a sign of legitimacy. Critics 
have noted that ―expansion has not enhanced ASEAN bargaining power‖ (International 
Institute  for  Democracy  and  Electoral  Assistance,  2001).  Thus,  the  evidence  that 
socialization  may  build  trust  and  change  beliefs  is  weak.  The  prior  discussion  of 
changing  attitudes  toward  cooperation  within  the  OAS  also  suggest that  this  did  not 
come  about  as  a  result  of  socialization  within  the  organization,  but  that  domestic 
changes in member states drove reforms within the OAS. 
 
Moreover,  there  is  little  research  on  whether  socialization  works  with  the  economic 
issues that are so central to regional integration efforts. Theory suggests that to the 
extent that defection from economic commitments is important, building trust through 
interaction within organizations is equally important. However, given that organizations 
that  deal  with  economic  matters  typically  also  have  specific  policy-related  entry 
requirements, or have some enforcement mechanisms, it is difficult to establish whether  
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states  keep  their  requirement  because  they  have  been  socialized  into  keeping  such 
commitments, or because of the enforcement mechanisms. For example, EU member 
states  generally  do  keep  their  commitments,  including  economic  commitments.  As 
discussed below, EU member states now implement about 96% of their commitments 
satisfactorily  (Tallberg,  2003).  Interestingly,  in  90%  of  the  cases  where  commitments 
were violated, the European Commission was able to gain compliance by naming and 
shaming  violating  states  by  publishing  the  violations.  However,  it  is  unlikely  that  this 
apparent socialization was really socialization at all, because states likely anticipated 
that the alternative to compliance would be court action, as discussed more below. 
 
Furthermore, when France and Germany missed the targets of the Stability Pact in 2003 
(Buti and Pench, 2004), the EU was not willing to use socialization tools to shame these 
countries, let alone resort to the pre-determined sanction measures. Thus, on such large 
economic matters and when dealing with powerful member states, membership in an 
organization does not appear to install a sense of obligation or appropriateness that 
automatically leads states to comply when other economic interests are at stake. The 
2010  Greek  debt  crisis  suggests  a  similar,  albeit  far  more  serious,  failure  of  both 
enforcement and socialization. 
 
To the extent that organizations can socialize states, is there any reason to think that this 
ability differs for convoy and club organizations? To date, no research has been done 
that  compares  convoys  and  clubs  with  respect  to  socialization,  partly  because  the 
comparison would be complicated by many other factors.  
 
Is  the  environment  within  a  convoy  organization  more  conducive  to  socialization  on 
some issues? Perhaps the more inclusive nature of the organization creates a better 
opportunity for  constructive  dialogue?  Consider the OSCE‘s  predecessor, the  CSCE, 
which was founded with the Helsinki Act in 1975 at a time in history when the security 
preferences  of  European  states  diverged  enormously.  Indeed,  some  states  were 
enemies. Given that the purpose of the Act was ―to improve and intensify their relations 
and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and co-operation as well as to 
rapprochement among themselves,‖
15 excluding potential member states through strict 
membership  criteria  would  defeat  the  organization‘s  very  purpose  to  recognize  ―the 
indivisibility of security in Europe as well as their common interest in the development of 
co-operation throughout Europe and overcome differences.‖
16 A club model would be 
more likely to increase hostilities, as demonstrated by the enlargement of North Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization  (NATO),  which  increased  trust  with  new  members,  but  raised 
hostilities with the still excluded Russia (Kydd 2001). Thus, it does appear that convoy 
models have an advantage over clubs when it comes to issues of reconciliation and 
security. This is important because regional integration efforts may not always begin with 
economic considerations. Indeed, as noted earlier, the EU, Mercosur, and ASEAN were 
motivated by political security considerations as well as economic goals.  
 
On the other hand, if convoys are more diverse because of their lower admission criteria, 
perhaps  when  it  comes  to  socialization  on  political  issues  other  than  security,  their 
                                                            
15  Helsinki Final Act. 1975. Introduction. 
16  Helsinki Final Act. 1975. Questions Relating to Security in Europe.  
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persuasive  power  is  lower.  Research  has  found  that  the  ability  of  international 
organizations to influence the level of democracy in member states depends in part on 
how democratic the organization‘s general membership is (Pevehouse, 2003).  
 
The absence of strong evidence for socialization sans strong enforcement measures 
does  not  mean  that  such  socialization  does  not  occur.  However,  the  relatively  weak 
evidence for socialization within organizations is nevertheless important for the question 
of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  different  membership  models.  This  is 
because convoy organizations have to rely on socialization within organizations more so 
than clubs do, because convoys cannot use ex ante tools and convoys are more likely to 
admit outlier states that may encumber other organizational efforts to influence member 
state behavior.  
 
3.4.2  Institutional Safeguards for Societal Elites 
 
Another  way  regional  organizations  may  influence  member  states  is  by  influencing 
domestic  stakeholders.  This  is  particularly  important  on  economic  matters.  Some 
research suggests that regional organizations make business interests more supportive 
of  economic  liberalization.  By  raising  the  costs  of  domestic  policy  changes,  regional 
organizations  help  guarantee  business  elites‘  economic  interests,  thus  making  them 
more  amenable  to  liberalization  (Pevehouse, 2003).  Other  research  has  found  that 
regional  trade  arrangements  help  lock  in  commitments  among  states  (Milner,  1995; 
Fernandez and Portes, 1998; Goldstein, 1998; Mansfield, 1998; Mansfield and Milner et 
al.,  2002).  Such  commitments  ensure  elites  that  free  trade  will  continue  even  if  the 
regime moves towards more democracy. Regional organizations that institutionalize free 
trade  agreements  by  promoting  regional  integration  may  be  able  to  influence  outlier 
states in the region to liberalize both economically and politically.  
 
Some research also suggests that regional organizations can decrease the domestic 
military‘s  concerns  that  liberalization  and  regime  openness  will  sideline  the  military. 
Southern European governments were able to internationalize the military‘s role through 
integration  into  NATO  (Pridham,  1994).  Some  work  suggests  that  by  increasing 
resources for the military, membership in NATO‘s Partnerships for Peace program was 
important in lowering military resistance to political opening and the completion of the 
democratic  transition  in  Hungary  (Vetschera,  1997).  Thus,  membership  in  regional 
organizations may increase the willingness of both economic and military stakeholders to 
liberalize.  
 
However, it is uncertain whether convoys and clubs are equally capable of promoting this 
stakeholder effect. The examples above relate to the provision of resources in the EU 
and NATO, suggesting that these benefits are more likely to be associated with trade- or 
security-related organizations. Importantly, however, it does not really seem to matter 
whether countries are actually full members of an organization. The stakeholder effect 
may  even  occur  before  a  country  becomes  a  full  member  of  an  organization.  For 
example,  to join  the  EU, countries first  must  sign Association Agreements  that  allow 
them to begin to benefit from trade and other arrangement with the EU. Association 
Agreements  with  the  then-European  Economic  Community  (ECC)  were  an  important 
factor in the democratization of Portugal (Manuel, 1996) and Spain (Whitehead, 1986;  
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Powell, 1996), even though the EEC did not admit these countries to the organization 
but only formalized trade and other agreements. Yet, these agreements with the EEC 
helped assure the domestic elites that democratization would not lead to loss of property 
or hinder the free movement of goods (Whitehead, 1996).  
 
The  types  of  guarantees  required  to  convince  stakeholders  tend  to  be  economic  in 
character  and  these  guarantees  can  be  rendered  to  countries  just  was  well  in 
intermediate associational membership arrangements as through full membership. This 
suggests  that  club  organizations,  which  are  more  likely  to  have  deep  economic 
assurances to offer, are not hindered by their exclusionary structure in using these tools 
of influence. Convoy organizations can also use these types of guarantees, but they may 
have fewer guarantees to offer if they have not been able to develop deep economic 
integration. 
 
3.4.3  Issue-linkage 
 
Some scholars have argued that admitting countries to an organization can draw them 
into a set of interrelated bargains that influence the interests and negotiating positions of 
states  (Sandholtz,  1996).  For  example,  research  has  found  that  in  situations  of 
asymmetric externalities, as in many environmental cooperation problems, welcoming 
states into an organization induces perpetrators to join and broadens the cooperative 
scope to take advantage of opportunities for issue-linkage (Mitchell and Keilbach, 2001). 
No research, however, compares the ability of convoys and clubs in using issue-linkage. 
At first, it may seem that clubs are at a disadvantage, because it is harder to link issues 
with  non-member  states.  This  may  be  mitigated  somewhat  by  giving  non-members 
associational status, or by using membership conditionality. Still, convoys in which all 
countries  are  equal  members  increase  the  opportunity  for  issue-linkage.  However,  if 
convoys tend to have shallower cooperation, then the linkage may not be very powerful.  
 
3.4.4  Legal Enforcements 
 
Another  tool  for  influencing  member  states  is  various  forms  of  dispute  resolution 
mechanisms ranging from informal ad hoc non-binding mechanisms to formal courts with 
binding  authority  that  can  serve  as  important  compliance  tools  after  admission.  The 
Council of Europe and the EU have well-developed courts, whereas many other convoy-
style  regional  organizations  rely  on  their  respective  councils  to  settle  disputes  over 
whether member states are complying with their commitments (Tallberg, 2003). 
 
In the infringement procedure under Article 226 (ex. Art. 169), the European Commission 
functions as prosecutor and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as judge. However, as 
noted earlier, the European Commission attempts to name and shame violating states by 
publishing the violations before it uses its power to bring cases to court. Indeed, only 
about 1 in 10 cases end up with the ECJ as most member states prefer finding amicable 
solutions. Thus, the rate of legal implementation of EU directives has been high for a 
long time and in the 1990s it rose to about 96% (Tallberg, 2003). The threat of referral to 
the ECJ is a very important tool in achieving compliance. 
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In the Council of Europe, which is a more open club than the EU, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) has been a strong tool for the Council‘s continued influence on 
member states after admission. However, the level of compliance with court decisions is 
lower than in the EU. 
 
The relevance of these legal enforcement mechanisms to membership models is that 
not all membership models may be equally able to acquire and apply such mechanisms. 
Effective dispute resolution mechanisms and courts may be harder to acquire and use in 
convoys than in clubs. Few organizations have effective courts yet, so it may be too 
soon to draw conclusions, but the fact that no convoy organization has really developed 
an  effective  court  may  well  be  because  the  convoy  organizations  are  likely  to  have 
greater preference divergence than clubs, and this divergence prevents support for such 
features  or makes their  use  intractable  under consensus  rules,  which  are  also more 
prevalent in convoy organizations. Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that the Council of 
Europe, which has a more heterogeneous membership than the EU on its own core 
issue of human rights, developed its court during a time when the member states were 
more heterogeneous than they are today. Path dependence may have played a big role 
in the existence of the ECHR, which is one of the few cases where an organization that 
has considerably lower entry requirements than the EU still has a relatively effective 
compliance tool. Furthermore, the success of the ECHR has been greatly enhanced by 
the  Council  of  Europe‘s  overlapping  membership  and  cooperation  with  the  dominant 
regional club, the EU. Thus, no country has ever joined the EU without first joining the 
Council of Europe.  
 
In spite of a strong legal enforcement system, it may difficult for regional organizations to 
successfully sanction their own member states, especially if sanctions are costly for all of 
the  organizations‘  members.  When  France  and  Germany  missed  the  targets  of  the 
Stability Pact (Buti and Pench, 2004), they promised to up their ante and the European 
Commission took no action. Punitive proceedings were started against Portugal in 2002 
and Greece in 2005, but penalties were never applied. Nor did the member states of the 
Euro choose legal actions to address the 2010 debt crises in Greece and elsewhere. 
Even strong legal tools may be useless in addressing fundamental economic issues that 
conflict with national interests. 
 
3.4.5  Suspensions 
 
Finally, organizations may be able to suspend or expel member states, as has occurred 
in several instances, such as the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, 
Egypt from the Arab League, and Guinea from ECOWAS.
17 Suspensions and expulsions 
are drastic measures and they are difficult to execute because they require a high level 
of agreement within the organization. Convoys lack rigid membership standards and the 
diversity of member state preferences within the organization will make agreement on 
such  drastic  censures  of  another  member  state  more  difficult.  When  Jordan  was 
perceived  as  violating  the  Arab  League‘s  norm  of  Arab  nationalism  in  1950  by 
negotiating a peace treaty with Israel, the League discussed expulsion of Jordan but 
ultimately  settled  on  a  strongly  worded  resolution  prohibiting  any  peace  agreement 
                                                            
17  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/11/content_10637610.htm  
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(Barnett and Solingen, 2007). Even clubs may be unable to agree on expulsions, and if 
the  area  of  cooperation  entails great  interdependence  among member  states,  as for 
example a single currency such as the Euro, then expulsions could be too devastating to 
implement. 
 
Suspension and expulsion are the most tangible tools that convoy organizations have. 
Such actions appear to have had only mild success. In 1992, the OSCE came up with 
the principle of ―consensus minus one‖ to suspend the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FYR). The  attacks  on  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  flagrantly  violated  the  FYR‘s  OSCE 
commitments. The suspension of Serbia and Montenegro continued for 8 years, but it 
seemed to achieve little. There was great debate within the OSCE about the best course 
of action. Perry (1998) noted that keeping the FYR out of the forum of debates in the 
organization  and  being  unable  to  send  representatives  to  engage  in  dialogue  was 
ineffective. 
 
Both  the  African  Union  and  the  OAS  have  become  increasingly  willing  to  suspend 
member states recently, but most of the time the target state merely shrugs off the act as 
has  occurred  most  recently  in  Honduras.  However,  in  one  case  in  particular,  a 
suspension may have had some effect. After a coup led by Jorge Serrano in Guatemala 
in May 1993, some argue that the OAS played a critical role by criticizing Guatemala and 
moving to sanction the regime. The military forced Serrano from office within 5 days and 
installed a civilian regime (Farer, 1996; Cameron, 1998). Still, any such case is naturally 
over-determined, so that the cause of the event cannot be isolated analytically. 
 
The EU has only once sanctioned a member state by curbing relations. This occurred in 
the case of Austria in 2000, when the extremist Austrian Freedom Party led by the racist 
Jörg Haider entered the Austrian government. Virulent debate ensued within the EU, but 
the diplomatic sanctions had no effect on Austrian politics. Haider did step down from his 
party‘s leadership eventually, but remained influential in party politics. 
 
In sum, there is not much evidence that suspensions or expulsions are effective tools for 
convoys or clubs. They elicit strong disagreements within the organization and target 
states are generally too preoccupied with domestic affairs to take notice. Furthermore, 
suspensions and expulsions tend to relate to political rather than economic matters, so 
there is little use for suspensions or expulsions as a tool of economic integration for 
either  convoys  or  clubs.  While  expulsions  or  suspensions  may  be  necessary  on 
principled grounds, that is not the focus of the present analysis. 
 
3.5  Summary 
 
Table  1  summarizes  some  of  the  observations  from  the  above  discussion  about  the 
available research on the effectiveness of various tools for clubs and convoys toward 
non-member and member states. The discussion above does not cover all the possible 
tools. For example, the use of aid and assistance programs is omitted, as are use of 
sanctions. Aid programs were omitted because their effectiveness is unlikely to depend 
on membership models, although their use is more likely to occur with rich trade clubs 
that  have  significant  resources  to  expend.  Sanctions  have  not  really  been  a  tool  of 
regional organizations, although theoretically they could be employed more often.  
26          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 53 
Table 1: Summary of Tools 
 
  Clubs  Convoys 
Membership conditionality  Extensively used; strong effects, both political 
and economic 
Not relevant 
Associational memberships  Extensively used; strong if used in conjunction 
with accession 
No purpose, unlikely to have any effect 
Ex ante monitoring  Extensively used; strong if used in conjunction 
with accession 
Not relevant 
Suspending association status for non-members  Occasional use; weak  Not relevant 
Exchanges, workshops, legal advice  Weak; directed mostly at political issues  Weak; any effects of the OSCE appear related 
to cooperation with the EU 
Socialization  Mixed results that appear contingent on the 
threat of enforcements or on the existence of 
inducements 
May have advantages on broad issues 
concerning security; may be weaker on political 
issues due to greater organizational 
heterogeneity 
Institutional safeguards for societal elites  Results uncertain; if it matters, it is likely to work 
best in trade areas and it is just as likely to work 
pre-accession, as long as trade occurs 
Rare and uncertain  
Issue-linkage  Common with both associational members and 
non-members through special agreements 
Uncertain 
Legal enforcements  Common; effectiveness depends on 
enforcement  
Rare and if it exists, likely weak 
Suspensions  Weak  Weak 
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Furthermore, the discussion of the different tools of influence cannot be summed up in a 
definitive statement about which membership model is the best. The above discussion 
has made no attempt at such a comprehensive evaluation, nor would such an evaluation 
based on past events necessarily predict future outcomes. However, the discussion does 
suggest some insights: 
  
(i)  On some issue such as security, the conciliatory and inclusive nature of 
convoy organizations retains advantages over clubs.  
(ii)  However, clubs do appear to have more tools at their disposal and these 
tools have been quite strong, at least in the European context. Of course, 
this context is defined by the unique post-communist environment that 
accompanied the end of the Cold War.  
(iii)  More generally, the discussion shows that membership models cannot be 
assessed  independently  of  the  activities  and  tools  of  specific 
organizations. The power of a convoy organization may, for example, be 
greatly enhanced by a strong judicial system or by close cooperation with 
other regional organizations that may be able to offer leverage.   
(iv)  Furthermore,  states  do  not  need  to  have  full  membership  before  an 
organization can interact with them. Clubs can extend various levels of 
inclusiveness that may offer opportunities for interaction akin to that of 
convoys. 
 
4.  How to proceed? Options for modes of integration 
 
This paper has argued that political integration and economic integration are linked, and 
that  regions  wishing  to  develop  deeper  economic  integration  must  be  prepared  to 
develop  deeper  political  integration.  The  process  of  regional  integration  cannot  be 
sovereignty  neutral.  Regional  integration  is  more  likely  to  succeed  if  the  region  can 
mitigate heterogeneity among states in their preferences, capacities, and beliefs. This 
entails a concern with domestic affairs, just as the creation of regional institutions entails 
some delegation of authority. 
 
Furthermore, a large number of members do not necessarily hinder intergovernmental 
cooperation. But as the number of states increase, their heterogeneity will likely increase 
and  thus  increase  complications  for  cooperation.  The  more  successful  attempts  at 
regional  economic  integration  have  shared  the  feature  of  starting  with  relatively  few 
member states.  
 
The comparison of the tools of influence in both club and convoy models suggests that 
the club model disposes over a greater array of tools. Convoys have historically shown 
strength in promoting security and reconciliation, but clubs such as the EU and Mercosur 
have also played important roles even in this area. Furthermore, clubs can set conditions 
for  membership,  yet  still  interact  with  non-members  though  trade  and  associational 
agreements. Some research even suggests that socialization efforts, the central method 
through which convoys seek to influence member states, work best when countries are  
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seeking  to  join  a  club.  Thus,  the  discussion  of  tools  of  influence,  although  far  from 
exhaustive, suggests that clubs are better positioned to address heterogeneity among 
states in a region.  
 
High admission criteria also reduce uncertainty about the behavior of a new member 
state. If states have to implement policies before joining, the likelihood that these policies 
will continue to comply with organizational standards is much higher. This is particularly 
important in economic matters when the interdependence among member states is very 
high,  such  that  the  failure  by  new  entrants  to  follow  the  organization‘s  policies  will 
impose high costs on existing members.  
 
The reality of the matter, however, is that many regions—from Latin America to Asia, the 
Middle East to Africa—launched their regional integration efforts through pan-regional 
convoy organizations. This was done foremost to protect national sovereignty. In other 
cases it was also to promote reconciliation. Thus, both the OSCE and ASEAN assumed 
a convoy form to build confidence and security in their respective regions.  
 
More importantly, no region today has a clean slate with respect to regional integration 
arrangements. Europe is far progressed, whereas other regions, although many have 
been engaged in regional integration efforts for decades, have still only made modest 
advances. Because of these efforts, however, all regions face constraints in terms of 
existing institutional arrangements. Yet, they also have a considerable range of options 
for membership models in the future. Even Europe continues to discuss optimal modes 
of  integration.  Although  no  region  begins  with  a  clean  slate,  and  although  existing 
arrangements impose some path-dependency, regions continue to evolve and still have 
the ability to shape the nature of their integration patterns. 
 
Regional integration cannot be apolitical or sovereignty-neutral. Cooperation is hindered, 
but not impossible, in regions with many heterogeneous states. Club models offer the 
best array of tools for reducing heterogeneity and promoting integration. Yet, regions 
have to work with their existing arrangements as a starting point. 
 
This brings up the introductory question of this paper: How can organizations navigate 
the  membership  models  to  their  advantage  to  deepen  regional  integration?  Clearly 
organizations such as the AU, OAS, and ASEAN cannot disinvite current members. They 
could expel members, but as noted, that has not been terribly effective, nor would that 
be  a  positive  step  towards  deepening  regional  integration.  However,  if  regions  have 
adopted a convoy model in the past, the variety of regional organizational forms to date 
suggest  ways  that  regions  and  organizations  can  evolve  and  in  so  doing  develop 
cooperative arrangements that draw on the lessons of this analysis in the future. 
 
4.1  Option 1: Degrees of Membership 
 
If all regional states are not already members, organizations can make greater use of 
varied associational forms. If an organization uses multiple levels of association, it can 
also  employ  different  participation  requirements  for  different  levels.  Observer  states 
usually have few rights within the organization except to observe. Associate members, 
however,  often  have  some  rights  and  can  obtain  benefits  from  the  organization.  
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Observer states sometimes are states that do not have a prospect of full membership, 
whereas associate states may be members-in-waiting. In both cases, an organization 
may  be  able  to  bring  countries  into  their  institutional  forums  by  granting  them  such 
intermediate levels of association. This may enable these states to be part of important 
debates  within  the  organization  and  it  may  enable  the  organization  to  set  some 
conditions for granting association  status. Thus,  an  organization  may  allow  states  to 
participate as observers or associate members, and these levels of membership can 
provide  opportunities  both  for  socialization  as  well  as  for  continued  leverage  over 
prospective members.  
 
4.2  Option 2: Entry Requirements can Change 
 
Entry  requirements  evolve  as  an  organization  deepens  the  scope  and  depth  of 
cooperation.  The greater the organization‘s existing body of rules and regulations, the 
greater the requirements for entering the organization, as any new member will need to 
take on the obligations of membership and existing organizational law. Thus, convoy 
organizations need not remain convoys with respect to future members. Organizations 
can introduce new entry requirements at any time, even if such have not traditionally 
existed. The Copenhagen Criteria introduced new requirements for joining the EU, with 
new  member  states  having  to  meet  requirements  that  the  initial  members  were  not 
asked to meet. Although an organization like ASEAN or ECOWAS may not have had 
certain requirements in place upon their founding, new requirements can be added. This 
can be partly because the organization has evolved and requires a different level of 
preparation before members can join smoothly, or it can be simply because the existing 
member states decide to impose new requirements. Furthermore, this need not mean 
that old member states will be scrutinized based on these new standards. The EU efforts 
at addressing ethnic minority problems in candidate states in the 1990s did not mean 
that  the  current  members  would  become  subject  to  similar  examination  and 
requirements. This may seem unfair, but the reality is that the current members can set 
the rules.  
 
4.3  Option 3: Multiple Institutions 
 
4.3.1  Layered Integration through Complementary Institutions  
 
Although a region might have created a convoy organization, not all cooperation need 
proceed within the frameworks of this organization. Rather, regions can take a layered 
approach  to  integration.  Regional  integration  may  proceed  via  multiple  institutions 
created to address different issues. This occurs in all regions, but Europe has again 
been  particularly  successful  at  using  this  structure  of  complementary  institutions.  In 
Europe,  separate  regional  organizations  were  created  to  address  different  issues: 
security, human rights, economics, and political integration.  
 
Instead of a multi-function, pan-regional convoy organization such as the AU or OAS, the 
Europeans chose to create a combination of organizations. The Council of Europe was 
founded in 1949 by 10 Western European states to address human rights issues. The 
founding members of the Council of Europe shared a set of human rights norms, and the 
Statute of London states that countries seeking to join the organization have to meet  
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these standards and can be suspended if they do not.
18 As such, the Council is a club 
organization, although its membership criteria are not as broad or elaborate as that of 
the EU. The Western European countries also formed two clubs, EFTA and the EEC, 
which  evolved  into  the  current  day  EU,  to  initiate  economic  cooperation  at  different 
levels. Over the decades, many EFTA members that originally preferred more limited 
economic cooperation have joined the EU. 
 
To address security issues, a smaller group of countries signed the Brussels Treaty in 
1948 and when they were joined by Germany and Italy in 1954, the Western European 
Union was created. Membership remained at 10 countries, however, although several 
other countries became observer states or associate members. Much later, in 1975, the 
pan-regional CSCE, spanning both Western and Eastern Europe, was created with a 
narrower security mandate. Initially the CSCE was a conference not an organization, but 
negotiations were open to all states in the region, making it a convoy-style organization.  
 
The  main  advantage  of  this  approach  is  that  it  allows  regions  to  apply  different 
organizational  membership  models  to  different  issues.  Given  that  the  nature  of 
addressing various issues s may favor different membership models, this differentiation 
can be advantageous. Furthermore, as opposed to the models of differential integration 
that  are  described  below,  complementary  institutions  can  have  completely  separate 
decision-making  and  administrative  structures.  This  can  allow  greater  institutional 
autonomy and avoid complex hierarchies within one organization. 
 
Importantly,  however,  the  European  organizations  have  worked  closely  together. The 
former  communist  states,  which  were  originally  excluded  entirely  from  economic 
cooperation in Europe, have also joined the OSCE, Council of Europe, and EU after 
making vast changes to their domestic politics and regulations. Regional integration in 
Europe has emerged from a very diverse set of states through a network of interlocking 
organizations that were able to mix convoy and club models to influence the states in the 
region. 
 
Other  regions  may  be  able  to  emulate  this  model  to  some  degree.  It  suggests,  for 
example, that regional human rights or monetary organizations may not be best situated 
within  the  existing  convoy  structures  created  to  address  security  issues,  as  is  for 
example  ASEAN‘s  recent  efforts  to  create  an  Inter-Governmental  Commission  on 
Human Rights. Rather, separate organizations, perhaps with fewer but more committed 
members, might be able to initiate deeper cooperation on human rights or on monetary 
issues if they are not held to the lowest common denominator of the existing convoy 
structure. Such an organization might benefit from greater institutional autonomy than it 
would enjoy if it were institutionally embedded within the convoy, while still sustaining 





                                                            
18  Statute of the Council of Europe. 1949. Article 3-8. Statute of Rome, European Treaty Series - Nos 
1/6/7/8/11.  
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4.3.2  Dangers of Sub-grouping  
 
A different pattern of integration is when states in a region form sub-groups that can 
exploit their homogeneity and smaller size to form multiple organizations. Sociologists 
have referred to this as nested enterprises (Ostrom and Benjamin, 1993). It occurs when 
a region ends up with multiple sub-regional organizations that individually pursue the 
same  objectives,  such  as  coexisting  common  markets  that  cover  different  countries 
within  the  same  region.  The  difference  between  sub-grouping  and  layering  is  that 
layered  integration  consists  of  regional  organizations  that  address  different  issues, 
whereas sub-grouping consists of organizations that address the same issues, but do so 
in smaller groups of states.  
 
Africa, for  example,  has  multiple  Regional  Economic  Communities (RECs)  that  have 
been formed among sub-groups of states in the region.
19 These RECs are nested within 
the African Economic Community (AEC), but they often have overlapping membership. 
In addition, there are RECs that are not organized within the AEC. Taken together, this 
makes for a very fragmented structure of regional and sub-regional organizations, all of 
which are progressing towards their stated goals of free trade areas and customs unions 
at  very  different  speeds  while  not  following  similar  standards  and  procedures.  This 
greatly complicates the attainment of the AECs goals of a single market and a central 
bank, despite rhetorical commitment to these goals.
20  
 
Merging  sub-groups  may  be  difficult.  EFTA  and  the  ECC  were  essentially  two  sub-
groups  created  to  address  economic  cooperation.  However,  they  did  not  eventually 
merge.  Rather,  most  of  the  EFTA  countries  joined  the  EEC.  This  is  because  trade 
diversion created what Baldwin has called a ―domino effect,‖ where all states eventually 
gravitate towards joining the larger market. As Baldwin notes: ―The final result was that 
the two blocs collapsed into one. The lesson for Asia today is that you cannot have two 
FTA [free trade area] blocs near each other. Once regional integration starts, it is hard to 
resist‖ (Baldwin, 2003). 
 
Subgroups  may  also  present  inter-organizational  conflicts.  For  example,  in  Latin 
America, Mercosur members cannot join the Andean Community of Nations (CAN)—a 
smaller  trade  bloc  that  includes  Bolivia,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  and  Peru—because 
Mercosur's charter prohibits its members from forging an FTA with nonmember nations. 
Thus, to join Mercosur, Venezuela had to leave CAN. However, Bolivia, which also aims 
to join Mercosur, refuses to leave CAN. To address the problem, CAN and Mercosur 




A  similar  potential  lies  in  Asia.  Here,  several  regional  organizations  now  have 
overlapping membership and overlapping agendas. As Dent (2010) notes, there is a risk 
that organizations such as ASEAN+3 or the East Asia Summit (EAS) will have competing 
goals  and  duplicate  efforts  on  issues  such  as  free  trade  and  energy  security.  The 
                                                            
19  http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/recs.htm 
20  http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i0GmLiOhihzyOZ4WZrjTghlGPosQ 
21  http://www.cfr.org/publication/12762/#p6    
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Australian  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  has  warned  that  ―less  can  be  more 
[because] while ASEAN, ASEAN+3, APEC, ARF, and the EAS are all potentially useful 
regional bodies, their mutual existence has the real potential to result in duplication of 
effort and dilute outcomes for both businesses and countries in our region.‖
22  
 
4.4  Option 4: Differentiated Integration 
 
Organizations  can  also  use  differentiated  integration  to  overcome  the  challenges  of 
heterogeneity. Differentiated integration refers to how an organization‘s existing member 
states may pursue future integration within the organization (as opposed to the layered 
integration described above, which involves separate institutions). Here again lessons 
are  best  drawn  from  the  EU,  where  three  modes  of  differentiated  integration  have 
occurred  and  where  significant  debate  continues  about  which  of  these  is  the  best 
approach to apply to future cooperation. 
 
4.4.1  Multi-speed Integration 
 
Multi-speed integration refers to the fact that states integrate at different times. Multi-
speed integration is when ―the pursuit of common objectives is driven by a core group of 
member states which are both able and willing to go further, the underlying assumption 
being that the others will follow later‖ (Stubb, 1996). Multi-speed is exemplified by the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), the harmonization of value-added taxes (VAT), as well 
as  by  the  accession  agreements  and  transition  periods  given  to  states.  With  EU 
accession,  all  new  member  states  become  members  of  the  EMU,  but  they  have 
derogations according to Article 7c of the EC treaty. Although most new member states 
are eager to join, this means that they can postpone EMU membership by not meeting 
the Maastricht criteria, as Sweden has done (De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2005). Similarly, 
Article 115 of the EC treaty allows states to take temporary protective measures against 
third-country imports (Stubb, 1996). 
 
Multi-speed  integration  has  also  been  used  vis-à-vis  new  member  states  in  the  EU. 
Transition periods can be particularly useful in economic areas where they decouple the 
institutional commitment from the stresses of adjustment. Thus, long transition periods 
have helped ease the process of transition to full membership for both old and new 
members  (Winters,  1997).  In  political  areas,  however,  transition  periods  can  be 
detrimental to achieving eventual compliance. For example, the Council of Europe has 
often used transition periods, giving new member states a fixed period to comply with 
certain democratic standards. Once admitted, however, states have been likely to ignore 
these requirements (Kelley, 2004a). 
 
Some multi-speed  integration may  also  have  developed  in Asia,  with  the  ―ASEAN-x‖ 
possibility embedded in the new 2007 Charter and the ―X+2‖ approach that allows two 
member countries to integrate certain sectors before other members are ready to join 
them.
23 
                                                            
22  Australian  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry.  February  2006.  Asian  Regionalism:  Less  can  be 
More. Press Release.  
23  http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/dhoct03.pdf  
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4.4.2  Variable Geometry 
 
Smaller groups can also enhance their cooperation even within large group settings, as 
demonstrated  by  the  EU‘s  use  of  so-called  ―variable  geometry,‖  the  most  prominent 
example being the monetary union (Alesina and Grilli, 1993). Variable geometry is ―a 
mode  of  differentiated  integration  which  admits  to  unattainable  differences  within  the 
main integrative structure by allowing permanent or irreversible separation between a 
core of countries and lesser developed integrative units‖(Stubb, 1996).  
 
Thus, variable geometry differentiates integration across space rather than time. It is a 
more permanent acceptance of the fact that some states do not wish to participate in 
certain objectives. It allows more stable separation between the hard core and periphery, 
permitting a core group of states to advance their cooperation without the rest. The term 
is most often used to describe differential integration within the EU. Examples include 
Airbus,  the  European  Operational  Rapid  Force  (EUROFOR),  Schengen,  and  the 
European Monetary System (EMS) (Stubb, 1996).  
 
More recent examples can also be found in Africa. For example: ―The New Partnership 
for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was developed by the five initial states of the OAU 
(Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) and formally adopted in July 2001. 
NEPAD's  primary  objectives  are  poverty  eradication,  sustainable  development,  and 
integrating Africa into the global economy. It focuses on establishing partnerships with 
industrial countries for increased aid, foreign investment, debt relief, and market access. 
In 2002, NEPAD was placed under the purview of the AU; a committee reports annually 
to the AU Assembly. In March 2007, NEPAD leaders decided the partnership should be 
integrated into the structures and processes of the AU.‖
24  
 
4.4.3  À la Carte 
 
À la carte integration is when member states can simply pick and choose what policy 
areas  they  want  to  participate  in  while  sharing  only  a  minimum  number  of  common 
objectives. Thus, it is differential integration across matter, as opposed to time or space. 
Rather than a group of states advancing with integration on a certain issue, à la carte 
integration  occurs  when  individual  states  opt  out  of  cooperation  that  is  proceeding 
among the rest of the organization. Examples include Denmark and the UK with the 
euro, Denmark with defense, the UK with social policy, and Ireland on abortion (Stubb, 
1996). À la carte integration is the least visionary mode of integration and it has so far 
been used mostly as emergency options when single countries have been unable to 
agree  to  further  integration  steps.  As  such,  it  is  an  important  tool  to  circumventing 
consensus-based  decision-making  procedures,  although  it  is  not  a  way  to  promote 





                                                            
24  http://www.cfr.org/publication/11616/african_union.html,  http://www.prlog.org/10132837-united-states-
of-africa-african-economic-community.html   
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4.4.4  Advantages of Differentiated Integration 
 
The point of these differentiated forms of integration is not the typology itself, but that 
options  exist  for  organizations  to  vary  the  membership  modes  even  within  the 
organization. Using multi-speed integration, for example, allows deeper cooperation to 
evolve, because it is not necessary to wait for all states to be prepared to undertake the 
commitments  of  cooperation.  Existing  convoy  organizations  can  include  all  member 
states in the visionary discussions of future integration, and then the prepared states can 
commence  without  excluding  the  other  states,  because  these  states  are  already  on 
course to join the cooperation when they are ready and they have had some voice in 
creating the institutional structures and rules. Thus, the non-participants remain outside, 
but are not excluded.  
 
On the  other  hand,  using  variable  geometry  allows  an  organization to  move  beyond 
seemingly irreconcilable differences without abandoning the organization as the regional 
framework for cooperation. Of course, variable geometry need not mean that initially 
disinterested countries cannot join cooperative efforts in the future, only that at the time 
of negotiations they have expressed no intention nor are they under any obligation to do 
so.  Both  multi-speed  and  variable  geometry  integration  offer  options  for  convoy 
organizations whose membership is too heterogeneous for the organization to deepen 
en masse.  
 
The danger, of course, is that multi-speed integration ends up being more permanent 
and actually becomes variable geometry. This can occur if some states forge far ahead 
of  poorer  countries,  for  example,  without  providing  assistance  for  these  countries  to 
catch up. 
 
Although  all  of  these  modes  of  differentiated  integration  fall  short  of  deep  and 
comprehensive integration, they may be an important alternative to the paralysis that 
might otherwise be produced by heterogeneous convoys. Over decades, they may turn 
out to be important stepping-stones to fuller integration. 
 
Furthermore, using differentiated forms of integration may allow organizations to make 
better use of the tools of clubs, even if the overarching organization is a convoy. By 
having  states  that  remain  outside  cooperation,  entry  requirements  can  be  made  for 
states  wishing  to  join.  Such  requirements  are  often  already  built  into  multi-speed 
integration, where they benefit from an inclusionary process of debate, such that late 
joiners have had a voice in the rules from the start. When organizations use variable 
geometry,  the  states  that  opt  for  deeper  cooperation  may  eventually  display  such 
benefits from their cooperation that the other states wish to join. In that case, the core 
group is able to use the tools of conditionality to ensure that states only join when they 
are committed to and capable of cooperating. 
 









Table 2: Membership Options 
 




Organizations set rules for membership and participation 
ranging from convoys to clubs, or any level in-between. 
Rules allow organizations to shape their membership and exert different 
forms of influence, but they can be politically contentious to enforce. 
Convoys 
Convoy organizations have low entry and participation 
requirements. 
Convoys are inclusive and enable the organization to engage with all the 
states in the region. Convoys may be particularly well-suited for socializing 
regional states. On some issues, such as security, the conciliatory and 
inclusive nature of convoy organizations may retain advantages over clubs. 
Clubs 
Clubs have high entry and participation requirements. 
Clubs are better able to use the tools of membership conditionality, 
monitoring, expulsion, and suspension. On complex regulatory matters, 
clubs are better able to ensure that new entrants can meet the expectations 
of membership.  
Degrees of Membership  
Organizations can use observer and associate status to 
interact with regional states. Observer states sometimes are 
states that do not have a prospect of full membership, but 
associate states may be members-in-waiting. Observer 
states usually have few rights within the organization except 
to observe. Associate members, however, often have some 
rights and can obtain benefits from the organization.  
Multiple levels of association allow organizations to use different 
participation requirements for different levels. In both cases, an organization 
may be able to bring countries into their institutional forums by granting 
them such intermediate levels of access. This may enable these states to be 
part of important debates within the organization and can provide 
opportunities both for socialization as well as for continued leverage over 
prospective members. 
Revisiting entry requirements  
Organizations can introduce new entry requirements any 
time, even if such requirements have not traditionally 
existed.   
Changing entry requirements allows them to evolve as an organization 
deepens its scope and depth of cooperation.  Thus, convoy organizations 
need not remain convoys with respect to future members.  
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Table 2: Membership Options, continued. 
 
Options  Description  Advantages and Disadvantages 
Multiple regional 
organizations 
Regions develop an array of organizations to address their 
cooperation needs. 
While layered integration is beneficial, sub-grouping can introduce problems.  
Layered integration through complementary institutions  
Although a region has created a convoy organization, not 
all cooperation need proceed within the frameworks of this 
organization. Rather, regions can take a layered approach 
to integration by creating multiple institutions to address 
different issues. Europe has been particularly successful at 
using this structure of complementary institutions.  
This approach allows regions to apply different organizational membership 
models to different issues. Given that the nature of different issues may favor 
different membership models, this differentiation can be advantageous. 
Furthermore, as opposed to the models of differential integration described 
below, complementary institutions can have completely separate decision-
making and administrative structures. This can allow greater institutional 
autonomy and avoid complex hierarchies within an organization. 
Sub-grouping  
States in a region form sub-groups that can exploit their 
homogeneity and smaller size to form multiple 
organizations. Thus, a region ends up with multiple sub-
regional organizations that individually pursue the same 
objectives, such as coexisting common markets, that cover 
different countries within the same region. The difference 
between sub-grouping and layering is that layered 
integration consists of regional organizations that address 
different issues, whereas sub-grouping consists of 
organizations that address the same issues, but do so in 
smaller groups.  
Sub-grouping risks a very fragmented structure of regional and sub-regional 
organizations that progress towards their stated goals at very different 
speeds and processes. This greatly complicates the attainment of larger 
regional integration, despite rhetorical commitment to these goals. 
Overlapping membership and overlapping agendas may present inter-
organizational conflicts and produce duplication of effort and diluted 
outcomes. 
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Table 2: Membership Options, continued. 
 
Options  Description  Advantages and Disadvantages 
Differentiated 
integration  
The use of either multi-speed, variable geometry, or à la 
carte integration is described below. 
Differentiated integration allows organizations to make better use of the tools 
of clubs, even if the overarching organization is a convoy. By having states 
that remain outside cooperation, entry-requirements can be made for states 
wishing to join. 
Multi-speed integration refers to the fact that states 
integrate at different times. A core group proceeds with the 
expectation that others will follow when they are ready. 
This approach allows some states more time to prepare for cooperation 
(transition periods) without holding up the whole organization. Non-
participants remain outside, but are not excluded from cooperation. Non-
participants benefit from an inclusionary process of debate so that late joiners 
have had a voice in the rules from the start. Multi-speed integration can be 
useful in economic areas by decoupling the institutional commitment from the 
stresses of adjustment. In political areas, however, transition periods can be 
detrimental to achieving eventual compliance. 
Variable geometry differentiates integration across space. 
It is a more permanent acceptance of the fact that some 
states do not wish to participate in certain objectives. 
Other states can later join, but they are not required to do 
so. 
Allowing more stable separation between hard core and periphery states can 
permit a core group of states to advance their cooperation without the rest, 
while still preserving the regional organization. The benefits of inclusion may 
eventually grow so strong that the other states wish to join. In that case, the 
core group can use conditionality to ensure that states only join when they are 
committed to and capable of cooperating. Variable geometry risks dividing the 
member states and introduces multiple possible issues for cooperation. 
À la carte integration is differential integration across 
matter.  Member states pick and choose what policy areas 
to participate in and share only minimal common 
objectives.  
À la carte integration prevents a single member state or a few states from 
entirely blocking cooperation. The lack of shared vision, however, undermines 
comprehensive regional integration, making it more an ad hoc arrangement.  
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5.  Questions for Asia 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the arguments of this paper: rules do reflect state preferences, but regions 
can also employ a variety of organizational forms and rules. These rules have different features 
that enable organizations to use various ex ante and ex post tools to influence the heterogeneity 
of states in the region. This heterogeneity, in turn, influences the ability of regional states to build 
strong joint institutions and the prospects for successful regional integration. 
 
Asia  remains  a highly  heterogeneous region  in a  number  of key  dimensions  (Haggard, this 
volume;  Hix,  this  volume)  that  include  preferences,  capacities,  and  beliefs.  Convergence  in 
these areas will be difficult to achieve and the foundation for regional integration is weaker than 
in Europe. Regional comparisons should be made with great caution. Unlike in Europe, market 
forces, not political forces, have been driving economic integration in Asia (Asian Development 
Bank, 2008), and this leaves much less room for grand political planning. The foundation for 
integration in Asia is further weakened by the region‘s strong antipathy towards delegation of 
authority to supra-national institutions (Baldwin, this volume, 64-65). 
 
However,  this  heterogeneity  and  aversion  to  supra-nationalism,  coupled  with  a  norm  of 
consensual processes, makes it important for Asia to consider the design of membership rules 
in regional organizations. This paper has argued that to the extent it is possible to bring about 
greater convergence of preferences, capacities, and beliefs, regional integration will be more 
likely to succeed. Furthermore, this paper has argued that membership rules may help bringing 
about greater convergence because they can provide different opportunities for influencing the 
preferences, capacities, and beliefs of states in the region over time. 
 
This  paper  has  been  focused  on  the  role  of  membership  rules  more  broadly  and  has  not 
provided a blueprint for the design of membership rules in Asian institutions. However, it does 
generate some suggestions for consideration in the Asian context for those with expertise in the 
region: 
 
1.  Organizations in Asia possibly take greater advantage of tiers of membership, thus 
avoiding outright exclusion, but yet reserving some leverage. 
 
This paper suggests that clubs have considerable advantages over convoys in terms of bringing 
convergence among states and deepening economic and regional integration. However, it also 
suggests that  there  are  several  ways  that  a  region  can  use  club-like features. The  existing 
convoy  structure  of  Asian  institutions  may  make  it  unlikely  that  new  organizations  of  core 
heterogeneous states can start independently of existing institutions. However, there may still 
be ways for Asian institutions to take advantage of club-like features. For example, existing 
organizations may make use of a wider range of associational forms of membership before 
admitting states fully. Although it is difficult, existing institutions can change their membership 
rules for new members and possibly adopt new tiers of membership. The criteria and process 
for  joining  the  EU,  for  example,  has  evolved  greatly  over  time. This  may  also  grow  out  of 
functional needs, as organizations with deeper integration will have a greater set of rules and 
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2.  Organizations in Asia may be able to make better use of differential integration 
 
Differential integration can create tiers of members within an organization of heterogeneous 
preferences.  However,  variable  geometry  does  provide  ways  for  broader,  convoy-like 
organizations  to  break  deadlocks  and  advance  cooperation.  This  need  not  proceed  on  a 
permanently exclusionary basis. Should some of the initial non-participants wish to join later, 
such an arrangement also creates leverage that the existing participants can apply to promote 
greater convergence before new states join. 
 
When states agree on a common objective, but have heterogeneous capacities, multi-speed 
integration provides a way for states to introduce participation requirements without complete 
exclusion. States not ready to participate can still take part in negotiations and the framing of the 
cooperation. They can remain as observers and then join when they are ready. Might Asian 
organizations usefully apply this concept? Some Asian organizations already grant transitional 
periods for new members, but this concept can also be used when a set of existing states within 
an organization wish to proceed.  
 
The caveat, however, is to use mechanisms to assist non-participants in joining, rather than 
creating permanent classes of rich and poor member states.  
 
3.  Asia may be able to benefit from layered integration, which allows countries to adapt the 
membership model to the issue at hand, because all issues are not bundled in one 
institution. 
 
The paper suggests convoys may have some comparative advantages over clubs on certain 
issues that lend themselves better to socialization. Whereas it is harder to use socialization to 
achieve some forms of cooperation, such as getting states to lower their tariffs, socialization 
may the best way to address human rights or security, for example. The paper suggests that 
Europe benefitted from a layered regional integration, which allowed different organizations to 
use  different  membership  models,  being  inclusive  on  topics  where  inclusiveness  was 
advantageous. Is layered integration a better solution to ongoing institutional proliferation within 
Asian organizations? Is a Human Rights Commission really best situated within the ASEAN 
framework, for instance? 
 
4.  Asia may be able to tailor membership rules to avoid inefficient sub-regional 
fragmentation. 
 
Latin America and Africa have both experienced a proliferation of regional economic integration 
efforts.  In  Africa  the  multitude  of  RECs  has  led  to  confusion  and  in  Latin  America  it  has 
highlighted the lesson learned in Europe, namely that regional economic institutions do not sit 
easily side by side. Asia is running the risk of developing too many overlapping and competing 
institutions. Rethinking membership rules in current institutions and ways to work from within 
these institutions may help avoid fragmentation. For example, to avoid institutional proliferation, 
some  sub-regional  organizations  could  consider  inviting  states  that  were  not  originally 
conceived as geographic candidates.  
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